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ABSTRACT 
 
Working Time Reductions at the End of the Career: 
Do They Prolong the Time Spent in Employment?* 
 
In this paper we study the effects on the survival rate in employment of a scheme that 
facilitates gradual retirement through working time reductions. We use information on the 
entire labour market career and other observables to control for selection and take dynamic 
treatment assignment into account. We also estimate a competing risks model considering 
different (possibly selective) pathways to early retirement. We find that participation in the 
scheme initially prolongs employment, as participants keep accumulating full pension rights. 
However, as participants become eligible for early retirement subsequently, these larger 
financial incentives induce them to leave the labour force prematurely. These adverse 
incentives are stronger for individuals who reduce their working time most. After two (four) 
years for men (women), the positive effects reverse. The more favourable effect for women is 
likely a consequence of their lower opportunities to enter early retirement. The gradual 
retirement scheme fails the cost-benefit test. 
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1. Introduction 
Population ageing puts enormous pressure on Social Security provisions in many developed countries. 
One of the main factors involved in this is the low labour force participation of older workers, and in 
particular of older women. In EU-15 countries in 2013, the labour force participation rates of workers 
aged 55-64 was 29 percentage points below that of workers aged 25-54 (OECD, 2015a). This difference 
was even more pronounced for Belgium, the country of analysis in this paper, where the participation 
rate of the older age group is 41 percentage points lower than the younger one. Low labour market 
participation at older ages is in many developed countries in part caused by early retirement. Even 
though in many EU15 countries the average legal retirement age is around 65, people still tend to 
retire two and a half years earlier (OECD, 2015b).1 In Belgium workers are observed to retire 
particularly early, with an average effective retirement age below 60 since the late 1980’s.  
A key strategy to cope with the challenge induced by population ageing is to prolong the working 
career and to increase the activity rates of older workers. However, simply continuing to work full-time 
at an older age might increase the risk of dropping out from the labour force due to declining health 
or to taking up care obligations (Gielen, 2009; Van Looy et al., 2014). It has been argued that workers 
might stay longer in the labour force if they could gradually reduce their working time at the end of 
their career (e.g. Schmid, 1998). 
Several EU countries have put gradual retirement schemes in place for older workers.2 These can take 
different forms. In Sweden, Finland and Denmark workers can reduce their working time and top up 
their income by prematurely drawing from their pension entitlements. In Belgium, Germany and 
Austria employees can reduce working time before entering into retirement and the government 
provides a subsidy to partially compensate for the income loss. In these countries employees can also 
choose the so called “block-model”. This model concentrates the reduced working time in the years 
prior to retirement by taking a leave of absence, actually inducing retirement to be early instead of 
gradual. Finally, before the abolition in 2012, Dutch employees could ‘save’ time early in their career 
to reduce working time later on. In this paper we evaluate the Belgian scheme. We study whether this 
Time Credit (TC) scheme can lengthen the career of older private sector workers.  
Evidence of the effectiveness of gradual retirement schemes based on counterfactual impact 
evaluations is scarce. Most research has focussed on studying the determinants of gradual retirement 
(e.g. Gustman and Steinmeier, 1984; Honig and Hanoch, 1985; Ruhm, 1990; Hutchens and Grace-
Martin, 2006; Hutchens, 2010; Kantarcı and van Soest, 2008, for a survey). Wadensjö (2006) uses the 
                                                          
1 Average over the period 2007-2012. 
2 See Table A.1 in the Appendix A for an overview of such schemes in the countries mentioned in the text. 
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counterfactual analysis of Sundén (1994) to determine the behaviour of part-time pensioners in 
Sweden in the counterfactual of no part-time pension and concludes that the scheme increased the 
number of hours worked in the economy. However, he underlines (on p. 27) that “the calculations are 
based on data which is not perfect for the task”. Based on the conditional independence assumption 
(CIA), Graf et al. (2011) and Huber et al. (2015) estimate the effects of the Austrian, respectively 
German, gradual retirement scheme. Both studies find that gradual retirement reduces the likelihood 
of unemployment. However, this does not imply that these workers remain employed longer, because 
if the “block model” is chosen, the worker is officially employed without actually working. Although 
workers in the inactive phase of the block model are counted as employed, Graf et al. find that in 
Austria the effect on employment is eventually negative. Similarly, Huber et al. (2015) report for West-
German participants in the scheme no significantly higher survival rate in employment. However, they 
do find significant positive employment effects for East-German participants and positive spill-over 
effects on younger workers. They attribute this differential finding to the difficult labour market 
conditions in East-Germany. Berg et al. (2015) also evaluate the German partial retirement scheme, 
but based on a difference-in-differences strategy. They find that participation in the scheme prolongs 
the working career for men, but less so in periods of more intensive use of the block model. Smaller 
and, in the period of more intensive use of the block model, even negative effects are reported for 
women. The authors do not consider differential effects for West- and East-Germany. Finally, Elsayed 
et al. (2015) use a stated preferences experiment based on vignettes to evaluate the effect of various 
hypothetical pension reforms in the Netherlands, among which the introduction of gradual retirement. 
This study finds that gradual retirement would induce workers to retire one year later on average, but 
also that total lifetime labour supply would still fall by 3.4 months.       
In this paper we focus on the component of the Belgian TC scheme that targets workers older than 
fifty, because it entitles eligible individuals to the TC until retirement and can therefore be viewed as 
a gradual retirement scheme. We exploit very rich administrative data on labour market histories (for 
private sector employment from as early as 1957), sick leave, exit destinations out of employment, 
and some essential firm and household characteristics. Based on these data we can estimate the 
impact on the survival rate in employment until eight years after entry into TC. Similar to the studies 
of Graf et al. (2011) and Huber et al. (2015), we base identification on the CIA. We argue that this is a 
credible identification strategy because of the richness of the data and because the analysis is 
restricted to the eligible population, which is relatively homogeneous. To be eligible an individual 
should have worked at least five years full-time in the same private sector firm employing at least 11 
employees and have accumulated at least 20 years of labour market experience. Moreover, even if 
information on important variables, such as ability, motivation and health histories, are missing, we 
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follow Lechner et al. (2011) and Huber et al. (2015)  by claiming that these unobservables are indirectly 
captured by conditioning on the very rich pre-treatment labour market histories. For instance, health 
problems should be reflected by gaps in the labour market experience or in lower earnings; Or, ability 
in the average earnings level.  
We contribute to the literature in the following ways. First, because the block model actually resembles 
more an early retirement scheme than a gradual one, we restrict, in contrast to the aforementioned 
studies, the treatment to genuine part-time workers and consider participants in the block model as 
inactive if they stop working. Second, we investigate whether the treatment effect depends on the 
extent of working time reduction – 20% or 50%. Third, we explicitly study the interaction between the 
impact of gradual retirement on the timing of withdrawal from the labour market and the supply 
incentives to exit the labour market via early retirement schemes. In particular, we provide suggestive 
evidence that the effectiveness of gradual retirement to prolong the labour market career depends on 
how participation in the TC scheme affects the level of the allowances in early retirement schemes. 
TC-beneficiaries keep on accumulating statutory pension rights of full-time workers, so that the 
relatively higher replacement income induces them to enter early statutory retirement more quickly 
than in the absence of TC. By contrast, TC-beneficiaries are less inclined to leave the labour force 
through alternative early retirement schemes, since the allowances in these schemes are less 
generous.     
Fourth, to the best of our knowledge, we are the first to provide (partial) evidence on a health outcome 
by analysing the effect of gradual retirement on the incidence of sick leave during employment. 
Furthermore, we propose a cost-benefit analysis in which we estimate, based on the CIA and using the 
administrative data, both the net budgetary costs for the state and the net welfare gains (or costs) for 
society. Finally, from a methodological perspective, we explicitly take into account that the TC scheme 
is not entered at a fixed moment, but can happen at any time. Sianesi (2004), Fredriksson and 
Johansson (2008) and Crépon et al. (2009) have shown that in case of such dynamic assignment into 
treatment, methods based on the CIA that assume that the treatment assignment is static are biased. 
They propose propensity score matching methods that take this dynamic assignment explicitly into 
account. Vikström (2014) built on these findings to suggest a method that takes into account that the 
right censoring induced by transitions into treatment may depend on observables and, hence, be 
selective, a problem that was overlooked in the literature. We use this estimator, but adjust it to 
consider that, for reasons explained in Section 4, our analysis is based on an endogenously stratified 
sample. It is well known that in this case consistent estimation requires appropriate weighing of the 
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data (Manski and Lerman, 1977).3 Such adjustment is straightforward in Vikström’s estimator, as it is 
implemented as an inverse probability weighting (IPW) estimator (Horvitz and Thompson, 1952; 
Hirano et al., 2003): it merely consists in an extra weighing of the data to take the endogenous sampling 
into account.  
Our findings can be summarized as follows. We estimate a positive short run effect of the TC on the 
survival rate in employment. This effect becomes negative after two (four) years for men (women). 
Qualitatively these effects are therefore similar to those found by Graf et al. (2011) for Austria. The 
negative effect is essentially explained by the fact that TC beneficiaries who enter statutory early 
retirement remain entitled to the level of pension benefits of a full-time worker, which makes early 
retirement relatively more attractive for those workers. Once we right censor individuals who leave 
employment for early retirement within the statutory regime, the significant negative effect of 
participation in the TC scheme on the survival rate in employment is very much reduced. Overall, the 
existing scheme does not pass the cost-benefit test.  
The paper is structured as follows. We start with a literature review. In Section 3 we describe the 
institutional context, while in Section 4 we describe the sampling scheme and the data we used. 
Section 5 outlines the empirical strategy (identification and estimation). In Section 6 we present our 
empirical findings and in Section 7 the cost-benefit analysis. The final section summarizes the results 
and concludes.  
2.  Literature Review 
It has been argued that workers might stay longer in the labour force if they could gradually reduce 
their working time at the end of their career (e.g. Schmid, 1998). Firms may voluntarily grant working 
time reductions if they realize that doing so allows them to keep valuable (firm-specific) competences 
and transfer know-how to younger employees (Eurofound, 2001; Kantarcı and van Soest, 2008). 
However, institutional constraints, such as provisions that the pension allowances depend on the last 
wage, or that a pension cannot be drawn upon while working part-time, may discourage older workers 
to reduce working time. In addition, employers may not be willing to award gradual retirement options 
(Hurd, 1996; Charles and Decicca, 2007; Gielen, 2009) so that government coercion or incentives may 
be necessary. 
It is, however, far from guaranteed that eliminating institutional barriers and offering an explicit option 
to gradually retire by part-time work would keep older workers longer in the workforce or increase the 
                                                          
3 In particular, Frölich (2007) demonstrates in a standard Kernel matching framework that endogenous sampling, contrary to 
choice-based sampling (i.e. sampling based on the treatment status), requires re-weighting the data both in the estimation 
of the propensity score and the treatment effect. 
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total number of hours worked. First, pay of older workers may exceed their productivity.4 If 
employment protection is strong and early retirement schemes are not yet available for these workers, 
then firms may use subsidized part-time employment at the end of the career as an easy way to get 
gradually rid of these less productive workers. The gradual retirement scheme is then just a ‘bridge’ to 
(early) retirement and does not prolong the working career (Graf et al., 2011). This process may be 
reinforced if a phased reduction in working hours (i) does not lead to a proportional reduction in the 
workload (Devisscher and Sanders, 2007; Rudolf, 2014), (ii) signals a preference for early retirement 
(Machado and Portela, 2012), or (iii) just decreases labour market attachment. Finally, even if the 
withdrawal from the labour force is delayed, the total number of hours worked may still decrease. An 
hours-constrained worker who is not offered the possibility to reduce working time has two options: 
Either stop working altogether or stay working full-time. If such a worker is then offered the possibility 
to limit the number of hours worked, she increases the number of hours worked if the first option was 
chosen, but the reverse holds for the second option. The net effect on the number of hours worked 
depends on the relative size of these effects (Gielen, 2009; Graf et al., 2011).  
The empirical literature studying the effectiveness of gradual retirement schemes based on 
counterfactual evaluations is very sparse. Graf et al. (2011) study the Austrian old age part-time (OAPT) 
scheme based on the conditional independence assumption (CIA) using propensity score methods (see 
e.g. Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009). They contrast all 6,142 men and 3,210 women who entered the 
OAPT scheme between 2000 and 2003 to a control group of 23,810 men and 28,651 women who were 
employed at least one day in 2000/2001 and to whom a hypothetical start date was assigned according 
to the simulation procedure described in Lechner and Wunsch (2008).5 They find that the OPAT scheme 
increases the number of days employed by 30 days on average during each of the first two years after 
entrance. However, in the fourth and fifth year the OPAT decreases the number of days employed by 
about 35 for women and by nearly 50 for men. Consequently, the cumulative effect over five years 
was negative. Moreover, these figures do not take into account that OAPT participants work part-time. 
In full-time equivalents the time worked diminished over five years by 26 (23) percentage points for 
men (women). On the other hand, the time spent in unemployment fell over this period by 37 (43) 
                                                          
4 There is some evidence that declining productivity with age or deferred compensation schemes induce a pay-productivity 
gap for older workers. Hellerstein et al. (1999) did not find evidence for a pay productivity gap in the U.S., but a recent 
replication of this seminal analysis reports that pay exceeds productivity for workers older than 55 in the manufacturing 
sector (Hellerstein and Neumark, 2007). Aubert and Crépon (2003, 2006) establish similar results for this age group in France, 
Ilmakunnas and Maliranta (2005) for Finland, and Cataldi et al. (2012) and Vandenberghe et al. (2013) for Belgium. By 
contrast, no pay-productivity gap is found in Portugal and in the Netherlands (Cardoso et al., 2011; van Ours and Stoeldraijer, 
2011). Frimmel et al. (2015) report evidence that in Austria employees of firms with higher labour costs for older workers 
leave the labour force at a younger age. 
5 As mentioned in the Introduction, this procedure has been criticised by Fredriksson and Johansson (2008).  
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days for men (women). This is most likely because in the “block-model” these workers were not 
required to be made redundant, since they were not working anyway. 
Huber et al. (2015)  use the CIA to study the effect of introducing partial retirement in Germany. A 
novelty in their approach is that they consider the intention-to-treat effects of introducing the option 
of partial retirement at the firm level on the labour market outcomes of the employees in these firms. 
More specifically, they contrast the labour market outcomes between 2003 and 2009 of employees in 
firms that started offering partial retirement between 2000 and 2002 to firms that did not offer this 
opportunity in this period. To avoid that the composition of the workforce in these firms would be 
influenced by the introduction of the partial retirement scheme, the estimation was restricted to 
workers who had at least three years of tenure in these firms in June 2000. The authors report very 
different findings for West- than for East-Germany and attribute this difference to the difficult labour 
market conditions in the latter region. In West-Germany the option of partial retirement did not have 
any significant impact on the timing at which the labour market was left, neither did it induce any spill-
overs to younger employees. However, as in Austria, the “block-model” affected the pathway to 
retirement. Rather than transiting to unemployment prior to retirement participants entered the non-
employment block of the scheme. By contrast, in East-Germany older workers remained significantly 
longer attached to the labour market, which resulted in net savings for the public authorities through 
lower benefit expenditures and higher tax incomes and social security contributions. Moreover, 
presumably by the financial incentive to replace the partial retiree by unemployed workers, the 
scheme generated positive spill-overs by increasing employment stability and by lowering the 
likelihood of unemployment of younger women (but not of men).  
Berg et al. (2015) also evaluate the German partial retirement scheme based on a difference-in-
differences strategy which contrasts a younger control group of 50-54 year olds to a treatment group 
of 55-65 year olds in the pre-treatment period (1993-1998) and two post-treatment periods: 1999-
2001 and 2002-2004, respectively a period in which the block-model was less and more intensively 
used. This analysis confirms that the block-model reduced the positive impact of the partial retirement 
scheme on the probability of staying in the labour force. During the period of less intensive use of the 
block-model male participants remained 1.8 years longer employed than non-participants, while this 
effect fell to 1.2 years in the period of more intensive use (if the time not working during the second 
phase of the block model is not considered as employment). The employment of female participants 
was, however, not affected in the former period, while it even declined by 0.2 years in the latter. The 
findings of Huber et al. (2015) refer to the period of more intensive use of the block-model. 
Nevertheless, it is not easy to compare the two studies, since, in contrast to Huber et al. (2015), Berg 
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et al. (2015) did not stratify the analysis between West- and East-Germany and did not consider spill- 
overs on the employment of younger individuals.  
Finally, Elsayed et al. (2015) use vignettes in a web-based survey of 3,611 Dutch public servants to 
evaluate the introduction of an early retirement scheme in the Netherlands.6 In this survey 
respondents get different vignettes of hypothetical retirement scenarios, including gradual retirement. 
For each of these vignettes the respondents should state at which age they would retire. In the 
vignettes that contain the gradual retirement scenario working time is reduced by 50% and workers 
are entitled to half of the full-time pension. The level of the pension replacement rate and its accrual 
with age varies according to the considered scenarios. As to provide causal interpretations of the 
systematic relations between the responses and the scenarios, different scenarios were randomly 
assigned to individuals. The study finds that a gradual retirement scheme would induce workers to 
retire on average one year later. However, total lifetime labour supply would still fall by 3.4 months, 
because the reduced working hours within the gradual retirement scheme dominate the delayed exit 
from the labour force. 
3. Gradual Retirement in Belgium: Time Credit Beyond the Age of 50 
In 2002 the Career Break scheme, in place since 1985 and available in both the private and public 
sector, was reformed and relabelled “Time Credit” (TC) scheme in the private sector. The schemes aim 
at generating a better work-life balance by enabling and encouraging employees, even without 
needing to specify a specific motive, to slow down their working pace. Workers younger than 50 can 
temporarily reduce their working time, while older workers can take advantage of these schemes 
without any time limit, as to enable a more gradual transition to retirement (Devisscher, 2004). We 
focus on a description of the main features of the latter section of the TC scheme, also called the end-
of-career TC. We restrict our description to the regulations in place during the 2002-2007 period. This 
covers the relevant period for the empirical analysis in this research. In 2015, the scheme is still in 
place, but most of the eligibility conditions have been strengthened considerably. Most notably, the 
age of eligibility was raised to 55 years in 2012 and starting from 2015 this age will gradually increase 
to 60 in 2019. Nevertheless, eligibility at 55 remains possible under certain circumstances.7  
Individuals older than 50 who are employed in a private sector firm are under certain conditions 
entitled to reduce their working time to 80% or 50% of a full-time, or even completely. They are 
entitled to a lump-sum state subsidy that partially compensates for the earnings loss that the transition 
                                                          
6 The initial sample consisted of 13,151 e-mail addresses. Hence, the response rate was only 27%. 
7 This is the case for workers in arduous professions, in case of partial work incapacity, in restructuring firms, or in cases that 
the employer organisations and trade unions have concluded a Collective Agreement and the employers agree to pay the 
subsidy to which participants are entitled that would otherwise be due by the Social Security scheme. 
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to part-time work involves. Notice that the possibility to completely stop working was much less used 
than the other regimes, because the subsidy was only 34% higher than the one obtained for the 50% 
regime and more generous early retirement schemes were available in this case, although generally 
only at older ages (see below). Since our interest is in gradual retirement, we do not further consider 
this regime. The main eligibility conditions for the end of career TC scheme were the following:  
1. Being at least 50 years old at the start of the working time reduction; 
2. Being full-time employed during the year prior to entry  for the 20% regime; being employed 
for at least 75% of a full-time schedule for the 50% regime;   
3. At least 5 years of tenure in the same firm;  
4. At least 20 years of labour market experience; 
5. Consent of the employer, if the number of employees in the firm is at most 10 or, in case the 
firm employs 11 workers or more, if the fraction of employees in the TC is strictly larger than 
5% (can be revised by a collective agreement); 
6. Notification to the employer at least 3 months prior to the working time reduction.  
 
If these eligibility conditions are satisfied the employee is entitled to a monthly lump-sum subsidy of, 
(i) in case of the 20% regime, €2248 for singles with or without dependent children and €186 for other 
household types, and, (ii) in case of the 50% regime, €400 for all household types. For the sample of 
TC beneficiaries analysed in this research, this results in a median replacement rate of 83% of the full-
time gross wage for those working 80%, and of 57% for those working half-time. As a comparison, the 
replacement rate after the top-up was 70% for a half-time worker in Germany and 75% when working 
40% to 60% in Austria. The replacement rate is therefore lower for a median worker in Belgium, but, 
since the subsidy is lump-sum in Belgium and proportional in Germany and Austria, it is higher for low-
wage workers in Belgium.9 
The end of career TC was very popular. The number of participants grew steadily from 8,700 in 2002, 
the year it was introduced, to 88,000 in 2011, the year prior to the one in which the age of eligibility 
was raised to 55. To compare, in 2001, the year prior to the reform, the number of private sector 
beneficiaries older than 50 in the Career Break scheme amounted to 18,745.10 As a share of private 
sector employees aged 50 or more, TC participation steadily increased from 2.5% in 2002 to 16.0% in 
2011. This growth is related to both, the rising employment rate of older women in this period and to 
the increased generosity of the TC relative to the Career Break. The subsidy amount was raised by 
                                                          
8 All € in the text are indexed by the CPI and expressed in constant 2004 euros.  
9 For the 20% (50%) regime the first and third quartile of this replacement rate ranges between 81% (55%) and 91% (62%), 
while the 90th percentile of this replacement rate, i.e. for low-wage workers, is as high as 96% (75%).  
10 Only new beneficiaries entered TC. The stock of existing beneficiaries remained entitled to the Career Break.  
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about 20% in the 50% regime and by nearly 40% in the 20% regime. The share of female TC participants 
steadily grew from 27% in 2002 to 52% in 2011.11  
Apart from the lump-sum subsidy, another major benefit for TC participants is that for the 
determination of the level of replacement income in the branches of Social Security, such as (early) 
statutory retirement and unemployment, TC beneficiaries are assimilated to workers with the same 
time schedule as before the working time reduction. This means that relative to their current income, 
TC participants earn a much higher replacement income (i.e. the ratio of the full-time (early) pension 
to the part-time labour earnings plus the TC allowance) if they leave employment for (early) retirement 
than workers who remain full-time employed. As a consequence, the incentive to stop working is 
significantly enhanced, especially for workers who choose the 50% TC regime: the numerator of their 
replacement income is unaffected, while the denominator significantly decreases. In line with these 
incentives, we will show in the empirical analysis that the participation in TC eventually enhances the 
transition to early retirement. Moreover, because these incentives were different across the different 
early retirement schemes, they also altered the pathway to early retirement. To understand this point, 
we briefly describe the different early retirement options in Belgium and the impact of the TC on the 
benefit level in these options.  
In Belgium there are essentially three early retirement schemes in the private sector: early retirement 
within the statutory regime, the conventional pre-retirement scheme (also known as the “bridge 
pension”) and the, so-called, “Canada Dry” system.12 In the period of analysis, early retirement within 
the statutory regime started from age 60 after minimum 35 years of employment experience.13 This is 
an early retirement scheme, because the statutory retirement is normally entered after 45 years of 
labour market experience or at age 65 for men. Women retired between 63 and 65.14 The benefit level 
is determined as at the statutory age and provides in case of a career of 45 years a replacement rate 
of 75% or 60%, depending on whether the partner of the beneficiary, if any, has any (replacement) 
income or not. This amount is proportionally reduced if the career is shorter than 45 years and is 
bracketed by a floor and a ceiling amount. Due to relatively low generosity of this scheme for full-time 
workers in the private sector,15 take-up in the two alternative regimes, especially the bridge pension, 
is much more important. For workers having more than 20 years of employment experience, the bridge 
pension is available from age 60 for all workers and from 58 in case of a sectoral collective agreement, 
                                                          
11 Sources: year reports of the RVA/ONEM 2001-2011. 
12 “Canada Dry” refers to publicity for the drink Canada Dry: “It has the colour of Whisky, but it is not Whisky”. 
13 This experience requirement was gradually increased from 20 to 34 years by steps of two years in each calendar year 
between 1997 and 2004, and, eventually, by one year to 35 years in 2005. 
14 The statutory retirement age for women was raised by one year every three years from 60 before 1997 to 65 from 2009 
onwards. 
15 For public sector employees the scheme is much more generous and, hence, more widely used. 
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mostly concluded in the industrial committees16 of the manufacturing sector. In restructuring firms 
and for arduous professions, the age condition could drop to 50, 52 or 55, depending on the sectoral 
agreement. Because of a supplement equal to half of the difference between the unemployment 
benefit (UB) and the wage, the bridge pension is more attractive, at least if they are not in TC (see 
below). The “Canada Dry” is an unofficial early retirement scheme in which the employer pays, as in 
the bridge pension, a supplement to the UB. This scheme is more flexible for the employer, because it 
does not impose an age limit among others (Albanese and Cockx, 2015). Since there is no obligation 
for the worker to report the supplement to the UB she obtains, no official figures on the use of the 
Canada Dry scheme are available.  
As already mentioned, the UB and the statutory (early) retirement pension for a beneficiary of TC is 
calculated on the basis of the fictitious earnings that the employee would have had if she would not 
have reduced her working time. By contrast, TC does decrease the benefit level of the bridge pension. 
Even if the entitlement to UB is based on the fictitious earnings, the supplement is equal to 50% of the 
difference between the effective part-time wage in TC and the UB and, hence, much lower or even 
zero if the UB is higher than the wage, which can happen in the 50% TC regime.17 Consequently, to the 
extent that the more restrictive age and experience requirements are satisfied, the statutory early 
retirement scheme is relatively more attractive than the bridge pension (and the Canada Dry) for 
beneficiaries of TC than for full-time workers. Moreover, the statutory early retirement can be entered 
without consent of the employer, while the bridge pension, Canada Dry or plain unemployment does 
require this consent, because the employer must then also compensate for the dismissal, which is 
costly for these older workers with substantial seniority. This explains why we find in the empirical 
analysis that TC increases the likelihood of ending the career through the statutory early retirement, 
especially in the 50% TC regime. 
4. Data & Sample Selection 
4.1. Database 
We use rich individual data that were obtained by merging administrative registers of the diverse Social 
Security institutions and of the National Register containing all Belgian inhabitants. The database 
became more comprehensive over time. From as early as 1957 until 1998 we have for employees in 
                                                          
16 Industrial committees are organized for each type of worker at the sectoral level. In these committees trade unions and 
employer organizations negotiate the collective agreements. These agreements are binding for all workers belonging to this 
industrial committee, irrespectively of whether they are unionized and, hence, represented in the negotiation.  
17 For instance, heads of household and singles with more than 20 years of experience and aged 55 or more are entitled to 
UB with a replacement rate of at least 60% (slightly higher for heads) and of 55% for cohabitants of heads aged 58 or more 
(with floor and cap). For younger workers or worker with less experience the level of UB is somewhat lower.  
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the private sector yearly information on earnings, the number of working days and hours (in case of 
part-time work) and the worker type (blue or white collar). From 1998 onwards this information is 
available on a quarterly basis (measurement at the end of each quarter), not only for employees in the 
private sector, but also in the public sector. In addition, from then onwards it also contains on limited 
firm information (size and sector), the industrial committee to which the worker belongs to (see 
footnote 16), the timing of self-employment spells, on UB receipt, as well as on participation in the 
Career Break, TC schemes and early retirement schemes. Finally, since 2003 the data have been 
complemented by information on sick leave, on receipt of statutory (possibly early) retirement benefits 
and replacement income in case of disability, occupational diseases or accidents. Finally, since 1998 
the National Register provides yearly information on December 31 on individual and household 
characteristics, such as age, gender, nationality, district of residence, household size (by age group) 
and type (single or couple, with or without children). The observation period in this study ends in the 
last quarter of 2011.  
4.2. Sample Selection 
In this study we base our analysis on a sample that was drawn with the purpose to evaluate the effect 
of a wage cost subsidy for employees in the private sector aged 58 years or more. The Belgian 
government introduced this subsidy in 2002 to enhance the employment of older workers (Albanese 
and Cockx, 2015). To that end a representative sample was drawn of 243,655 individuals born between 
the 1st of April 1941 and the 31st of March 1950, i.e. aged between 52 and 61 in 2002. Because in 
Belgium many individuals are already inactive in that age bracket, the sample was not only stratified 
according to gender, but also into 9 birth cohorts 𝑐 (= 1, 2, … , 9) and 5 strata 𝑟 (= 1, 2, … , 5). These 
strata were defined according to employment status in the private sector and the earned wage in the 
period around the 2002 reform. This stratification aimed at over-representing groups that are 
relatively rare in that age bracket and more responsive to the labour market policy reform: low-wage 
employees in the private sector and individuals transiting in and out of employment during this period. 
In Appendix B more details on this stratification can be found. Because the stratification involves 
outcome variables of interest, it is endogenous and it is well known that consistent estimation then 
requires to appropriately weigh the data in these strata (e.g. Manski and Lerman, 1977; Cameron and 
Trivedi, 2005). If we denote the sampling weight for individual observation 𝑖 belonging to birth cohort 
𝑐 and to substratum 𝑟 by 𝑊𝑐𝑟,𝑖, then 
𝑊𝑐𝑟,𝑖 =  
𝑁𝑐𝑟
𝑁
 ∗  
𝑛
𝑛𝑐𝑟
            (1) 
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where 𝑁𝑐𝑟 denotes the size of the population in substratum 𝑐𝑟,
18 𝑛𝑐𝑟 the corresponding sample size, 
𝑁 ≡ ∑ ∑ 𝑁𝑐𝑟
5
𝑟=1
9
𝑐=1  the total population size and n the corresponding sample size. As to avoid 
cumbersome notation, gender is not explicitly referred to. The weighting formula comes from a double 
re-weighing, within and between cohorts.19 
In this study we aim at evaluating the impact of participating in TC on the survival rate in employment. 
The TC scheme was introduced in 2002. Nevertheless, we start the evaluation only from 2003 and this 
for two reasons. First, we wish to consider the scheme at a moment when it is well established and 
the rules are well known. Second, we also aim at integrating the incidence on sick leave as a second 
outcome. As mentioned before, information on sick leave is only available since 2003. 
We evaluate the impact of TC spells that started in 2003 and 2004. In principle we could also consider 
TC that started in later years. However, the available sample participation in TC declines over time and 
these additional treatments would not be helpful in identifying the long-run effects (up to eight years 
after the start of the treatment) in which we are particularly interested.20 
Because the TC can start at any moment within the eight years of analysis, there is a dynamic 
assignment into treatment which induces, as mentioned in the Introduction, some intricate 
methodological issues (Fredriksson and Johansson, 2008). In particular, individuals who start the 
treatment later on may confound the control group. Besides, participants may anticipate the 
treatment. In Section 5 we will explain in more detail how we deal with these issues. At this point we 
limit the discussion to what this implies for the definition of treatment and control groups.  
First, as to model this dynamic assignment process and to take it into account we must split up the 
assignment period into sub-periods. If the sample size would not be an issue, one would split up this 
period as finely as possible. However, within the available sample the transition rate into TC is relatively 
low, so that we ran into inference problems when we defined quarterly intervals. We therefore chose 
to consider yearly intervals. Furthermore, to have a sufficiently high number of treated individuals and 
increase precision we perform two separate analyses on two treatment groups, depending on whether 
the TC started in 2003 or 2004, and pool the estimates.  
A second important issue is anticipation. Participation in TC is always anticipated, because the 
employer must be notified at least three months before the start. This means that the treatment 
                                                          
18 We have information on the population sizes in each substratum, i.e. on 𝑁𝑐𝑟. 
19 First, to restore the representativeness within the cohorts we reweigh the units within each cohort by 𝑊𝑐𝑟
𝑐 =
𝑁𝑐𝑟
𝑁𝑐
 ∗  
𝑛𝑐
𝑛𝑐𝑟
 
(where 𝑁𝑐 and 𝑛𝑐 is the size of the cohort in the population and in the sample). To make the cohorts in the sample 
representative for the population, we weigh each cohort a second time: 𝑆𝑊𝑐𝑟 = 𝑊𝑐𝑟
𝑐 ∗  
𝑁𝑐
𝑁
 ∗  
𝑛
𝑛𝑐
, so that 𝑊𝑐𝑟 =  
𝑁𝑐𝑟
𝑁
 ∗  
𝑛
𝑛𝑐𝑟
.  
20 The decline in the number of participants is due to the ageing of our sample, exiting the labour force over-time. Official 
statistics from RVA/ONEM show that until 2005 the share of employees in TC steadily increased by about 2 pp in each year.  
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actually starts before the working time reduction related to the TC scheme is implemented. To take 
this into account we therefore assume that a treatment actually starts one quarter earlier than it 
contractually does. Hence, with this new assumption, the period that determines treatment is 
advanced one quarter, so that an individual is defined to be member of the first treatment group if she 
actually participates in a TC at the end of the third quarter 2003 (2003Q3) while she did not at the end 
of 2002Q3. However, shifting the start of the treatment is not sufficient to deal with anticipation, 
because without information on when the treatment actually started, it is impossible to determine 
whether it had any impact on the outcome between the actual and contractual start of the treatment 
i.e. exit from employment.21 We therefore impose the additional assumption that individuals never 
leave employment in this period. This assumption biases the treatment effect upwards (i.e. a higher 
survival rate in employment for the treated). However, this bias is arguably small, because it is unlikely 
that individuals who agreed with the employer that they would start TC within the next quarter would 
eventually decide to stop working beforehand. This would presumably only occur for reasons of force 
majeure, such as an accident. 
In order to enhance the comparability of treated and control groups, we impose that members of both 
groups should satisfy criteria slightly stricter than those that determine eligibility to TC: 
1. Being employed in a firm with at least 20 employees at the end of 2002 (2003);  
2. Have at least 5 years of tenure in the same firm at the end of 2002 (2003);  
3. Have at least 20 years of private sector labour market experience at the end of 2002 (2003);  
4. Being full-time employed in all four quarters of 2002 (2003); 
5. Being employed in the private sector at the end of 2003Q3 (2004Q3); 
6. Not being on sick leave at the end of 2003Q3 (2004Q3).  
The fifth selection criterion is imposed at the end of each assignment period into treatment, because 
it is automatically satisfied for the members of the treatment groups, so that it is natural to impose it 
on the members of the control groups as well. The other criteria are slightly more restrictive than the 
TC eligibility conditions (Section 3), so that a few treated individuals are eliminated from our initial 
selection. We are slightly more restrictive for the following reasons: (i) Eligibility conditions 1-4 are 
uniformly imposed at the end of the year preceding the contractual start of the TC so that the same 
conditions apply to all treated and control units; (ii) Because the data contain only basic information 
about firm characteristics, we aim at restricting the analysis to sufficiently large firms in which the use 
of TC does not require the consent of the employer (Section 3). If no consent is required, it is less likely 
                                                          
21 Any form of employment is considered: part-time or full-time, public, private or self-employment, but between the actual 
and contractual start of TC the worker must be full-time employed, since otherwise she would not be eligible to TC at the 
contractual start of TC. 
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that the use of TC is selective in firm characteristics, which therefore enhances the internal validity of 
the evaluation. However, according to the rules, no consent is required in firms with more than 10 
employees. Nevertheless, we include only firms that employ at least 20 workers. This is because the 
available data on firm size are grouped in intervals that do not allow identifying firms with strictly more 
than 10 employees; (iii) While regulations do not impose that the labour market experience should be 
accumulated in the private sector, we do because we do not have information on early experience 
outside the private sector; (iv) We impose full-time employment in the last year prior to contractual 
assignment into treatment, while for the 50% TC regime the requirement is only to have worked at 
least 75% of a full-time job. This is done to consider only individuals who are eligible to both regimes; 
(v) Finally, we impose the last condition on sickness in 2003Q3 (2004Q3) because we want to contrast 
the impact of the benchmark outcome, i.e. survival in employment, to a more restrictive variant that 
considers survival in employment without being on sick leave. If we would not impose this, some of 
the selected individuals would not be in the risk set of this second outcome at the start of the 
evaluation period. Imposing this condition only very marginally affects the sample selection. Finally, 
note that we do not impose the age condition, because our sample only contains individuader than 
50.  
Based on these selection rules we retain, for men, 1,227 treated and 29,791 control units. For women 
the sample size is smaller: 762 treated and 9,658 control units. By using the sampling weights defined 
in Equation (1) we find that this represents in the Belgian population about 5,124 treated and 90,387 
control units. Note that the control units in the two years of analysis partly consist of same individuals, 
while treated units are always different.  
4.3. Descriptive Analysis 
As described in the previous Section, our sample is composed of individuals satisfying the eligibility 
conditions to the TC one year prior to the selection of 2003 (or 2004). Consequently, the individuals 
considered in the analysis are relatively homogeneous in the dimensions that matter for these 
conditions such as employment experience in the private sector (20 years), tenure (5 years), firm size 
(> 20 employees) and full-time work in the year prior to the selection (2002 or 2003). Even if the 
individuals in the two groups are already homogenous in several dimensions, they still differ 
significantly in a number of other dimensions. This justifies the use of the Inverse Probability Weighting 
(IPW) estimator proposed in the next section. The full list of variables on which we condition in the 
analysis are shown in Table 1. We distinguish between men and women, because the analysis is 
performed separately for these groups. The units in the treatment and control groups for the 2003 and 
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2004 analyses are pooled. Note that 54.3% of the treated are in the 50% TC regime, the remainder in 
the 20% TC regime. 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Selected Treated and Control Groups (weighted by 𝑊𝑐𝑟,𝑖) 
  Men Women 
    TREATED CONTROL 
P-value: 
equality 
TREATED CONTROL 
P-value  
equality 
Status one 
year before 
selection 
(2002 or 
2003) 
Firm size: 20-99 18.8% 30.2% 0.000 26.4% 32.9% 0.000 
Firm size: 100-999 30.9% 37.8% 0.000 27.9% 36.7% 0.000 
Firm size: > 1000 50.4% 32.0% 0.000 45.8% 30.4% 0.000 
Household: Other 11.2% 13.4% 0.043 35.7% 40.8% 0.009 
Household:  
Couple with children 
46.4% 48.1% 0.326 24.3% 24.4% 0.984 
Household:  
Couple without children 
42.4% 38.5% 0.025 39.9% 34.9% 0.010 
Age  55.5 55.8 0.000 55.4 55.7 0.000 
Blue collar 23.5% 30.5% 0.000 10.3% 12.4% 0.095 
Av. Full-Time Hourly wage € 20.7 € 22.5 0.000 € 17.5 € 17.7 0.365 
Belgian 98.0% 95.0% 0.000 97.2% 96.3% 0.236 
Household size 2.6 2.7 0.022 2.1 2.1 0.630 
Region: Brussels 5.7% 7.1% 0.079 15.4% 19.2% 0.009 
Region: Flanders 70.2% 64.8% 0.001 51.9% 48.0% 0.055 
Region: Wallonia 24.1% 28.2% 0.007 32.8% 32.8% 0.968 
Sector: Trade, transport, hotel 15.0% 20.7% 0.000 21.6% 24.6% 0.073 
Sector: Bank, business services 44.6% 18.7% 0.000 39.7% 24.5% 0.000 
Sector: Other services 4.0% 6.8% 0.000 21.5% 26.3% 0.004 
Sector: Manufacturing, 
 Agriculture, Construction 
31.8% 47.5% 0.000 17.2% 24.6% 0.000 
Sector: Construction (for men) 4.6% 6.3% 0.018  -  -  - 
Early retirement propensity 
 in the Industrial Committee* 
-1.0% 1.8% 0.000 -3.6% -2.0% 0.000 
5 years before 
selection 
Av. Full-Time Hourly wage € 20.2 € 22.3 0.000 € 17.0 € 17.3 0.249 
13 years 
before 
selection 
Years with the same employers 10.6 11.8 0.000 11.1 11.7 0.000 
1990-1997 Av. Working time (%) 98.0 97.5 0.002 95.8 96.2 0.272 
1957-1997 
Experience in years 31.2 31.0 0.071 30.1 29.7 0.023 
Av. Earnings in the year € 29,010 € 30,247 0.000 € 23,831 € 23,368 0.141 
N individuals 
Sample Size (Unweighted) 1,227 29,791   762 9,658   
Represented Population Size 
(Weighing Sample Size - 𝑊𝑐𝑟,𝑖) 
3,863 75,778   1,261 14,609   
* Estimation based on a linear probability model using the complete sample of 243,655 individuals (cf. Section 4.2) on the 
period 1998q1-2002q3. We regress “transiting to a bridge pension” on dummies for the Industrial Committee (IC) or Nace if 
IC is missing, birth cohort dummies and gender. The retained variable contains the coefficients (i.e. marginal effect) of the IC 
dummies. In a sensitivity analysis we replace these marginal effects (estimated by OLS) with the predicted probabilities 
(estimated by a probit model) at the average Xs. Results are very similar and available upon request.  
 
First, we consider the variables measured the last quarter prior to the start of the selection (i.e. 2002Q3 
and 2003Q3 for the first and second analysis). Treated units tend to work in larger firms, live with a 
partner without dependent children, are slightly younger, earn a lower hourly wage and, are more 
likely to be Belgians living in Flanders. Finally, they are concentrated in specific economic sector such 
as the banking and business related services and more in general in white-collar work. The industrial 
committees where they tend to work are the ones where bridge pension schemes are less common.  
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Second, we consider both the recent and less recent employment history.22 In line with the year before 
the selection, treated individuals earn a lower hourly wage five years before selection and had lower 
average annual earnings since 1957 (the difference is statistically significant only for men). Tenure in 
the same firm is slightly shorter and total accumulated working experience since 1957 is slightly more 
important. If we consider also the 5 years of tenure prior to the sample selection, then the individuals 
in the sample have on average about 36 years of experience, which makes many of them already 
eligible to the statutory early retirement.23 
Figure 1: Raw Sample - Differences in Survival Rate in Employment by Treatment Status 
 
Differences in survival rate by treatment status (ATT). The survival is defined with respect to employment and the point 
estimates are expressed in percentage points (pp). Pooled estimates for the treated samples of 2003 and 2004. The pooled 
sample is composed of 1,227 male (762 female) treated and 29,791 male (9,658 female) control units. Standard errors are 
cluster robust to take into account correlation between the same individuals in the two sample. 
To have a first idea on the possible effect of the TC we compare in Figure 1 the survival rate in 
employment of treated and control individuals following the treatment. Treated individuals show a 
higher likelihood to survive in employment in the first two years (four for women) but the cumulated 
effect on the survival rate reverses and reaches a maximum of -20% for men and -15% for women in 
the sixth/seventh year. From this descriptive evidence it seems that individuals entering the schemes 
tend to remain in employment for a few years longer. This is consistent with the hypothesis that they 
initially continue working as to accumulate pension rights of a full-time worker. However, as time 
                                                          
22 The variables referred to the employment history are not combined to keep information coming from different sources 
and periods with missing information separate. For example, information from 1998 comes from payroll-tax-administration 
(quarterly data), while from 1957 to 1997 from pension registrations (yearly data). 
23 Note, however, that the measure of experience in Table 1 is likely overestimating the definition used in the determination 
of the eligibility to a statutory pension, and thus overstates the likelihood of eligibility.  
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evolves they are more likely to become eligible to the statutory early retirement scheme and, because 
they earn a higher replacement income than those who did not take-up TC (Section 3) they eventually 
withdraw faster from the labour market.  
By the end of the period of analysis, i.e. 2011q3, 93.7% of the treated units are no longer employed 
while this share is only 81.8% for the control sample. The specific exit destinations for the treated and 
control group can be found in Table 2. The main difference in behaviour is that control units tend to 
use the bridge pension as the most common pathway to retirement while for the treated units this is 
the statutory early retirement. This is related to how participation in TC affects the benefit entitlement 
within these different early retirement schemes. As explained in Section 3, the statutory early 
retirement pension for a beneficiary of TC is calculated on the basis of the fictitious earnings that the 
employee would have had if she had not reduced her working time. By contrast, TC does decrease the 
benefit level of the bridge pension. In Section 6 we will show that the descriptive evidence in this 
section is qualitatively not much affected if we take the compositional differences between treated 
and control groups into account. 
Table 2: Exit Destinations (%) by Treatment Status 
  Treated (%) Controls (%) 
Statutory early retirement 48.5 23.2 
Bridge pension 34.2 38.5 
Unemployment 1.7 2.0 
Statutory retirement at the legal retirement age 4.1 8.8 
Other inactivity 5.2 9.3 
Never exit 6.3 18.2 
Sample size (Unweighted) 1,989 39,449 
Exit destinations of the treated and control group in the quarter after leaving employment in % of total exits. Note that some 
individuals never exit and remain employed until the end of the period of analysis. Unemployment contains the Canada Dry. 
Other inactivity includes among others people who die and a small minority (0.6%) of exits to disability schemes. Differently 
from other countries, these schemes are not particularly generous compared to the early retirement scheme. 
5.  Empirical Strategy 
5.1. Notation and the Treatment Effect of Interest  
We are interested in estimating the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) in TC on the survival 
rate in employment.24 An exit from employment is defined as soon as an individual is not observed in 
employment at the end of a quarter. In case of an exit, 93% of the individuals never return to 
employment before the statutory retirement age. This means that this exit is, in most cases, equivalent 
to an early withdrawal from the labour market, i.e. a pathway to retirement. We impose that once a 
                                                          
24 As a second outcome the survival rate in employment without sickness leave is considered. Since this does not affect the 
empirical strategy we ignore this in the further discussion of this section.  
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treatment has started it cannot be reversed. This means that the treatment status is not affected in 
the rare cases that the TC scheme is left immediately after having entered it.  
This evaluation problem is very similar to the one described by Vikström (2014). Since we follow 
Vikström’s methodology closely, the exposition in this section is also analogous. The essential 
differences are the following. First, we generalize his procedure to allow for the endogenous sampling 
present in our data. Second, we do not base the evaluation on a flow sample of individuals in a state, 
but instead a stock sample of individuals who have been employed for at least 5 years at sample 
selection.25 If we normalize time to zero at the beginning of the two periods of analysis (i.e. at the end 
of 2002Q3 and 2003Q3 and consider the residual duration from then, we argue that the analysis does 
not require any adjustment. Third, we propose a different trimming rule for the determination of a 
common support for treated and control units. Finally, we propose a slightly different bootstrap 
procedure for inference on the pooled sample.  
  Figure 2: Graphical Representation of the Notation 
 
In Figure 2 we provide a graphical representation of the introduced notation. Let 𝑡 ∈ {1,2, … ?̅?} denote 
the number of years since sample selection (i.e. at the end of 2002Q3 and 2003Q3) and 𝑙 ∈ { 1, 2, … , ?̅?} 
the elapsed number of years in employment at this start. ?̅? and ?̅? are the maximum number of years 
in employment respectively, after and before selection. In the data 𝑙 ≥ 5, because this is an eligibility 
condition for the TC and a sample selection criterion (Section 4.2). The random time since sample 
selection until the start of the treatment, i.e. entry in TC, is denoted by 𝑆 and its realization by 𝑠, where 
𝑠 ∈ {0,1, … , 𝑆̅} and 𝑆̅ ≤ ?̅?. 𝑌𝑙+𝑡(𝑠) is equal to one in case employment is left in year 𝑙 + 𝑡 and treatment 
started in year 𝑙 + 𝑠, and zero otherwise. 𝑌𝑙+𝑡(∞) denotes the potential outcome in year 𝑙 + 𝑡 if never 
treated and 𝑌𝑙+𝑡 the observed outcome. ?̅?𝑙+𝑡(𝑠) ≡ {𝑌1(𝑠), 𝑌2(𝑠), … , 𝑌𝑙+𝑡(𝑠)} and ?̅?𝑙+𝑡 ≡
{𝑌1, 𝑌2, … , 𝑌𝑙+𝑡} denote, respectively, the sequence of potential and of observed outcomes.  
                                                          
25 The 5 years of tenure condition is imposed at the end of 2002 (2003) for the first (second) treatment and control group, 
while sample selection requires the individual to be employed at the end of 2003Q3 (2004Q3) - the second condition 
mentioned in Section 4.2. Thus, at the end of 2003Q3 (2004Q3) 99.75% of the selected individuals have at least 5.75 years of 
tenure and 20.75 year of labour market experience. We ignore for simplicity this detail in the exposition of the empirical 
strategy.  
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We aim at identifying the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) of treatment 𝑠 years after 
sample selection against the counterfactual of never being treated on the residual survival in 
employment until year 𝑡 > 𝑠, given survival in employment until sample selection: 
∀𝑡 > 𝑠: 𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑡(𝑠) ≡ 𝐸𝐿{𝐸[?̅?𝐿+𝑡(𝑠) = 0|𝑆 = 𝑠, ?̅?𝐿+𝑠(𝑠) = 0] 
− 𝐸[?̅?𝐿+𝑡(∞) = 0|𝑆 = 𝑠, ?̅?𝐿+𝑠(𝑠) = 0]|𝐿 ≥ 5}          (2) 
This extends the ATT as parameter of interest to evaluation of a stock sample. Since in a stock sample 
individuals may have a different elapsed duration, the conditional expectation is taken over these 
elapsed durations, conditional on being employed for at least 5 years to take into account that one 
needs at least 5 years of tenure to be eligible for TC. Observe that 𝐸[?̅?𝐿+𝑡(. ) = 0|𝑆 =. , ?̅?𝐿+𝑠(. ) = 0] =
𝑃𝑟[𝑇 > 𝐿 + 𝑡|𝑆 =. , 𝑇 > 𝐿 + 𝑠] holds, i.e. the conditional probability of surviving 𝐿 + 𝑡 years in 
employment given survival until 𝐿 + 𝑠. In case 𝐿 = 0, Equation (2) reduces to the corresponding 
expression in Vikström (2014) for a flow sample.26  
5.2. Identification  
In order to identify 𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑡(𝑠) we use two identifying assumptions: CIA and no anticipation (NAA). These 
assumptions can be formalized as follows: 
 𝑪𝑰𝑨 ∀𝑙 > 5, ∀𝑠, ∀𝑡 > 𝑠: 𝑆 ⊥  𝑌𝑙+𝑡(𝑠) | 𝑋            (3) 
and  
 𝑵𝑨𝑨 ∀𝑙 > 5, ∀𝑡 < 𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝑠′, 𝑠′′): 𝑃𝑟(𝑌𝑙+𝑡(𝑠
′) = 1) =  𝑃𝑟(𝑌𝑙+𝑡(𝑠
′′) = 1),          (4) 
The latter condition means that individuals do not alter their behaviour in response to a future 
assignment to the treatment. Based on these assumptions Fredriksson and Johansson (2008), Crépon 
et al. (2009) and Vikström (2014) prove that for 𝑙 = 0 𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑡(𝑠) can be identified by successively using 
the not yet treated at 𝑙 + 𝑡 to estimate the exit rate under no treatment at 𝑙 + 𝑡 for those treated at 
𝑙 + 𝑠. Vikström (2014) generalizes by explicitly allowing for selectivity on observables in subsequent 
assignments into treatment. We follow his approach. Because the identification proof is not affected 
for different values of 𝑙, we refer the reader to Vikström (2014). 
Before discussing estimation and inference, we first argue why we believe that the available data are 
sufficiently rich to justify identification on the basis of the CIA, i.e. that we observe all relevant 
                                                          
26 In contrast to e.g. Crépon et al. (2009), Vikström (2014) does not impose 𝑡 > 𝑠. This means that he also considers the 
𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑠(𝑠), i.e. the treatment effect in the period that the treatment starts. However, identification of this treatment effect 
requires that the treatment starts instantaneously at the start of this period. Without this assumption the control units are 
longer at risk of leaving employment than the treated, because treatment is only possible if one survives in employment until 
the treatment start. This biases the treatment effect upwards. Since we choose the period lengths to be equal to one year, 
this bias could be substantial.  
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determinants that influence the decision to participate in TC as well as the survival rate in employment. 
With regards to the NAA, we refer to our discussion in Section 4.2.  
The literature mentions the following key determinants of gradual retirement also affecting the 
survival in employment: age, household composition, place of living, entitlement to (early) retirement 
benefits, education, health and firm characteristics, such as size and sector, but also the degree of 
unionization, organizational features and staff related issues, such as staff and skilled workers 
shortages (e.g. Gustman and Steinmeier, 1984; Honig and Hanoch, 1985; Huber et al., 2015) . The 
exhaustive information on the labour market history since 1957 allows us to condition on the most 
essential information required to determine the level of (early) retirement benefits to which workers 
are entitled. Household information is sufficiently available. By contrast, the database does not contain 
information on the level of education and the available indicators of health can only be used as 
outcomes, not as conditioning variables (see Section 4.2). Nevertheless, we believe that this is not 
problematic, because health problems should be indirectly captured by gaps in the labour market 
experience, in lower level of earnings, and being a blue collar worker or not. A similar reasoning applies 
to the level of education. Huber et al. (2015) stress the importance of having rich firm characteristics 
to condition upon. However, we believe that this is less important in our institutional environment 
than in theirs. In Germany firms decide on whether they make the partial retirement available to their 
employees. By contrast, in Belgium TC is a right to which employees are entitled without consent of 
the employer, at least in firms larger than 10 employees on which we focus in this analysis. 
Nevertheless, it is still crucial to condition on the available firm characteristics, i.e. on the firm size and 
sector, because these are highly correlated with the degree of unionization, and, more relevant for the 
Belgian context, with the working conditions. This is because working conditions, negotiated in the 
sectoral industrial committees, usually depend on firm size and apply to all workers, irrespectively of 
their union membership. Finally, a major pathway to retirement is the bridge pension, so that it is 
important to control for factors that influence the transition to it. We have seen in Section 3 that the 
availability of the bridge pension depends importantly on which industrial committee the worker 
belongs to. Because the number of industrial committees is too large to condition upon in the analysis, 
we therefore constructed a continuous measure of the propensity of transition to a bridge pension. 
How this measure is constructed is explained in a footnote to Table 1.  
5.3. Estimation and Inference  
Vikström derives the Inverse Probability Weighting (IPW) estimator, introduced by Horvitz & 
Thompson (1952) and Hirano et al. (2003), to estimate the 𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑡(𝑠) defined in (2). We follow this 
approach for the following reasons: (i) Busso et al. (2014) find in their Monte Carlo simulation that the 
 
 
22 
 
normalized IPW estimator is one of the best performing matching estimators in the presence of good 
overlap. Other Monte Carlo simulations of (Huber et al., 2013; Frölich et al., 2015) confirm the good 
performance of the IPW estimator, although it does not outperform other Propensity Score-based and 
non-parametric estimators; (ii) It is easy to integrate the endogenous sampling weights. This merely 
requires to include an additional weight in the estimation; (iii) Compared to other matching estimators, 
the IPW estimator is simple and computationally fast. 
We provide the most general estimator that does not only allow to take into account selective (on 
observables) right censoring as a consequence of not yet treated individuals getting treated (Vikström, 
2014), but also more general forms of selective right censoring that may involve both treated and not 
yet treated individuals. For instance, we will consider estimations of the treatment effect on different 
exit destinations when terminating employment (i.e. a competing risk framework). We will distinguish 
between exits to bridge pensions, statutory early retirement and “other” exit routes. 
To be able to write down the estimator, let us denote the random censoring duration since sample 
selection for individual 𝑖 by 𝐶𝑖. If we then generalise Vikström’s formula (see his Appendix A.3) for the 
endogenous sampling weights 𝑊𝑐𝑟,𝑖 and take the elapsed employment duration 𝑙𝑖 into account, we 
obtain:  
ATT̂t(s) = ∏ [1 −  
∑  Wcr,i ∗ Wl,k(s),i
C (s) Yk,i 1(Y̅l+k−1,i = 0)1(Si = si )1(Ci > s)
∑ Wcr,i ∗ Wl,k(s),i
C (s)i 1(Y̅l+k−1,i = 0)1(Si = s)1(Ci > s)
]
t
k=s+1
 
− ∏ [1 −  
∑  Wcr,i ∗ Wl,k(∞),i
C (s) Yk,i 1(Y̅l+k−1,i = 0)1(Si ≥ ki )1(Ci ≥ k)
∑ Wcr,i ∗ Wl,k(∞),i
C (s)i 1(Y̅l+k−1,i = 0)1(Si ≥ k)1(Ci ≥ k)
]
t
k=s+1
 
(5)  
where  
𝑊𝑙,𝑘(𝑠),𝑖
𝐶 (𝑠) =
1
∏ [1 − 𝑐𝑚(𝑋𝑖, 𝑙𝑖)]
𝑘
𝑚=𝑠+1
 
𝑊𝑙,𝑘(∞),𝑖
𝐶 (𝑠) =
𝑝𝑠(𝑋𝑖 , 𝑙𝑖)
1 − 𝑝𝑠(𝑋𝑖 , 𝑙𝑖)
1
∏ [1 − 𝑝𝑚(𝑋𝑖, 𝑙𝑖)][1 − 𝑐𝑚(𝑋𝑖, 𝑙𝑖)]
𝑘
𝑚=𝑠+1
 
𝑝𝑡(𝑋𝑖, 𝑙𝑖) = Pr (𝑆𝑖 = 𝑡|𝑋𝑖, 𝑆𝑖 ≥ 𝑙𝑖 + 𝑡, ?̅?𝑙+𝑡−1,𝑖 = 0) 
𝑐𝑡(𝑋𝑖, 𝑙𝑖) =  Pr (𝐶𝑖 = 𝑡|𝑋𝑖 , 𝑆𝑖 ≥ 𝑙𝑖 + 𝑡, ?̅?𝑙+𝑡−1,𝑖 = 0) 
where 𝑋𝑖  denotes the vector of predetermined explanatory variables, 𝑊𝑙,𝑘(𝑠),𝑖
𝐶 (𝑠) and 𝑊𝑙,𝑘(∞),𝑖
𝐶 (𝑠) are 
the IPW weights in year 𝑙𝑖 + 𝑘 for individual 𝑖 treated in year 𝑙𝑖 + 𝑠 and not yet treated in year 𝑙𝑖 + 𝑘, 
respectively. 𝑝𝑡(𝑋𝑖, 𝑙𝑖) and 𝑐𝑡(𝑋𝑖, 𝑙𝑖) denote the conditional probability of entering the treatment, 
respectively censoring state after 𝑙𝑖 + 𝑡 years conditional on still being employed in 𝑙𝑖 + 𝑡 − 1 . In other 
words, they represent the discrete hazard of entering treatment, respectively censoring in year 𝑙𝑖 + 𝑡.  
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To clarify the intuition of the estimator defined in Equation (5) consider first the case without right 
censoring, i.e. 𝐶𝑖 = ∞, 𝑊𝑙,𝑘(𝑠),𝑖
𝐶 (𝑠) = 1 and 𝑊𝑙,𝑘(∞),𝑖
𝐶 (𝑠) =
𝑝𝑠(𝑋𝑖,𝑙𝑖)
1−𝑝𝑠(𝑋𝑖,𝑙𝑖)
1
∏ [1−𝑝𝑚(𝑋𝑖,𝑙𝑖)]
𝑘
𝑚=𝑠+1
. Apart from the 
weights the first sequence of products in (5) is the standard Kaplan Meier survivor estimator for the 
treated group. This represents the conditional survival rate in employment until year 𝑙𝑖 + 𝑡, conditional 
on treatment and survival in employment until year 𝑙𝑖 + 𝑠, i.e. the product of one minus the discrete 
hazards from employment between 𝑙𝑖 + 𝑠 + 1 and 𝑙𝑖 + 𝑡. The second sequence of products is a similar 
Kaplan Meier estimator for the control group (or not yet treated individuals), which estimates the 
survival rate of the treated in the counterfactual of no treatment. In order to make these control units 
comparable to the treated they are reweighted using the standard IPW weights 
𝑝𝑠(𝑋𝑖,𝑙𝑖)
1−𝑝𝑠(𝑋𝑖,𝑙𝑖)
 in a static 
evaluation approach, where 𝑝𝑠(𝑋𝑖, 𝑙𝑖) is the estimated Propensity Score (PS) for an individual treated 
in year 𝑙𝑖 + 𝑠. However, to take into account that not yet treated individuals gradually become treated, 
we must consider that this may change the composition of the control group over time. Hence, 
Vikström (2014) shows that we must in addition weigh the control units by 
1
∏ [1−𝑝𝑚(𝑋𝑖,𝑙𝑖)]
𝑘
𝑚=𝑠+1
, i.e. by 
the inverse of the probability of not yet being treated in each period between 𝑙𝑖 + 𝑠 + 1 and 𝑙𝑖 + 𝑡.  
If individuals are right censored before exiting to the destination of interest and this is selective (i.e. 
depends on 𝑋), then this may similarly gradually change the composition of now not only the control 
group, but also of the treatment group over time. We therefore need to weigh both treated and control 
samples by 
1
∏ [1−𝑐𝑚(𝑋𝑖,𝑙𝑖)]
𝑘
𝑚=𝑠+1
, i.e. the probability of not yet being right censored in each period 
between 𝑙𝑖 + 𝑠 + 1 and 𝑙𝑖 + 𝑡.  
In contrast to Vikström (2014), the discrete hazards to treatment and censoring depend on the elapsed 
employment duration 𝑙𝑖 at sample selection.
27 Observe that we can only proxy for this elapsed 
employment duration, because prior to 1998 we only have annual (instead of quarterly) information 
on private sector employment and no information on self-employment, neither on employment as civil 
servant. Given that we selected individuals with at least 5 years of tenure and 20 years of experience 
in the private sector, we believe that the bias induced by using this proxy is negligible.  
We estimate separate ATTs for individuals entering treatment in 2003 and 2004. Subsequently, we 
pool, as Vikström, these analyses to have more precise estimates. This is done by averaging the 
estimated ATTs in each survival year, taking into account the size of the two different treated groups 
in the population, and, hence, weighted by the endogenous sampling weights. 
                                                          
27 Because the Kaplan Meier estimators in Equation (6) are averaged over all individuals in the sample, we average, as in the 
definition of the ATT in Equation (2), implicitly over the elapsed employment durations, conditional on this elapsed duration 
to exceed 5 years.  
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   𝐴𝑇𝑇?̂? =  ∑
𝑛𝑠
∑ 𝑛𝑠𝑠
𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑠+𝑡̂ (𝑠)𝑠             (6) 
where 𝑛𝑠 ≡ ∑ 𝑊𝑐𝑟,𝑖 ∗𝑖 1(𝑆𝑖 = 𝑠).  
As the lack of overlap of the PS can bias the estimator and increase the variance (Lechner and 
Strittmatter, 2014), we trim treated units with too high PS not having a correspondent control unit in 
a neighbourhood. In particular, we remove the treated units with a PS above the 99.9 percentile of the 
control units. After trimming, we remain with about 99% of the treated units, counting 1,212 and 755 
men and women. (Huber et al., 2013) propose to remove the control units with a weight higher than 
4% of the total. However, because the sample of control units is large, this additional trimming is not 
required. In the four analyses (2003 and 2004, men and women) the highest relative weight is only 
0.17% of the total sample. 
By weighing, the estimator becomes heteroskedastic. In addition, an individual in the 2003 sample may 
appear a second time in the 2004 sample. To take the resulting correlation in account, we cluster the 
standard errors by individual. However, standard clustering does not take into account that the PS in 
the weights 𝑊𝑙,𝑘(.),𝑖
𝐶 (𝑠) are estimated. We therefore bootstrap the standard errors. Since our data 
come from an endogenously stratified sample, we cannot apply a standard bootstrap. Instead, we 
implement a stratified bootstrap by randomly drawing for each replication 𝑛𝑐𝑟 individuals within each 
cohort-stratum 𝑐𝑟. This is valid because the bootstrap randomly samples individuals within each 
cohort-stratum (for a review on bootstrap and stratified data see e.g. Shao, 2003). To take individual 
serial correlation into account we re-sample within each replication the same individuals (i.e. clusters) 
in the two analyses (2003 and 2004 sample). 
In general, based on observables, the selectivity into treatment is low in 2003. The Pseudo R-squared 
of a standard logit model is 0.068 and 0.026 for men and women. The selectivity is slightly higher in 
2004. The corresponding Pseudo R-squared are 0.127 and 0.084. In terms of specification, the IPW 
estimator performs well in balancing the distribution of the covariates. Once reweighting the control 
units by 𝑊𝑙,1(∞),𝑖
𝐶 (𝑠), in the worse scenario (women selected in 2004) the median Standardized Bias 
(SB) is as low as 1.2%, the highest SB is 2.9%, the Pseudo R-squared of the reweighted sample is 0 and 
the Wald test28 for the joint significance of the variables after the reweighting produces a pvalue of 1. 
In Appendix C, we report the full list of balancing tests (Table C.3). The corresponding diagnostics for 
the other models such as heterogeneous effects can be obtained from the authors on request. 
                                                          
28 The Wald test should be used to assess the balancing as the log-likelihood ratio test proposed by Sianesi (2004) is not 
robust against heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. It tends to over-reject the null of good balancing.  
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6. Results 
We first report the 𝐴𝑇𝑇?̂? from the first until the eight year after entry in the TC (𝑡 ∈ {1, … 8}) on the 
main outcome of interest. In Section 3 we have argued that, relative to full-time workers, the TC 
scheme increases the incentives to enter early retirement, in particular the early statutory retirement 
scheme from the age of 60. Moreover, we argued that these incentives were more important for 
participants in the 50% TC regime than those in the 20% regime. In Section 6.2, we demonstrate that 
the empirical evidence is in line with these incentives. To that end we estimate the different 𝐴𝑇𝑇?̂? of 
each TC regime separately for the three following exit destinations of employment: bridge pension, 
statutory early retirement and other exits. In this section we also split the sample according to age to 
study treatment heterogeneity for the benchmark outcome. Finally, in Section 6.3 we study the effect 
of the TC on the health conditions of participants. We do not consider sick leave as a separate exit 
destination, because the number of exits to this destination is too small for credible inference. Instead, 
we broaden the benchmark outcome by including temporary sick leave into failure risk and compare 
the estimates to the ones considering non-employment (the benchmark) as the only exit destination. 
All the analyses are conducted separately for men and women. The reported results pool the 2003 and 
2004 sample.  
 
6.1. The Benchmark Analysis 
In this section we show the estimates of the ATT on the survival rate in employment controlling for 
selection on observables (Vikström, 2014). As Figure 3 shows, estimates are not significantly different 
from the descriptive evidence shown in Section 4.3. Treated men are more likely to survive in 
employment in the first two years (+7 pp and +3.5 pp), while for women the positive effects last until 
the fourth year and are stronger (+8.8 pp, +10.9 pp, +8.6 pp and +3.2 pp). The more positive effect for 
women is partly, but not completely, explained by the fact that they are less likely to work in industrial 
committees that intensively use bridge pensions as a way to terminate employment early, especially 
in the 20% regime (see below). However, the results also confirm the strong subsequent negative 
effects, peaking up to -20 pp and -12 pp for men and women, respectively. Notice that as a 
consequence of ageing all individuals, both treated and non-treated, will eventually retire. This 
explains why the treatment effect eventually always tends to zero at the end of the period of analysis. 
From these estimates, it seems that controlling for the rich set of covariates does not significantly 
affect the differences in survival rates between the treated and the control groups. This is because the 
imposition of the TC eligibility conditions on the control group has already enhanced the comparability 
of treated and control groups very much.  
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Figure 3: ATT on Survival in Employment and Descriptive Evidence 
 
ATT on the survival rate in employment estimated by controlling for the dynamic selection on observables (Vikström, 2014) 
and descriptive evidence (RAW) as reported in Figure 1. The estimates of the ATT’s are the percentage points (pp) differences 
between the survival rate of the treated in case of treatment and the estimated survival rate of the treated in the 
counterfactual of no treatment. Estimates are pooled over the 2003 and 2004 samples. Year eight only uses information from 
the 2003 sample. Standard errors are obtained by a stratified bootstrap (clustering by individual) with 500 repetitions and 
95% confidence intervals (CI) by assuming normality. 
 
Our results are in line with the findings of Graf et al. (2011) in Austria. Similarly to the Austrian scheme, 
our estimates show that individuals entering the schemes tend to remain in employment for a few 
years longer. However, the cumulative impact becomes negative after some years. The positive effects 
in the beginning are likely present because, as long as they are not eligible to early retirement, the TC 
participants keep on working part-time while accumulating pension rights of a full-time worker. 
However, as these workers also start to satisfy the age and experience requirements, they gradually 
enter the most remunerating early retirement scheme. To gain more insights into the forces driving 
these results, we decompose in Section 6.2 the ATTs by distinguishing between the TC-regime (20% or 
50%), the destination-specific survival rates in employment and the age of the participants. 
6.2. Competing Exit Destinations and Different Treatment Regimes 
In this section we decompose the estimated ATT on the survival in employment according to three 
possible exit destinations: (i) bridge pension, (ii) statutory early retirement and (iii) other exits. The last 
is a residual category comprising other schemes such as Canada Dry, unemployment, disability and 
other forms of inactivity, and exit because the individual deceased. As to simplify the estimation 
procedure, we do not estimate these competing risks simultaneously, but right censor the other 
destinations, when considering the destination of interest. This is valid because, conditional on the 
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observed covariates, the latent destination specific survival times are independent of each other.  
Recall that we have shown in the descriptive analysis in Section 4.3 that most of the exits are to the 
first two destinations. For a better understanding of the role of financial incentives, we divided the 
treated sample into participants in the 50% (Figure 4) and 20% TC-regime (Figure 5). The treated 
sample is divided in 942 units participating in the 50% TC-regime and 1,047 in the 20% regime. In the 
corresponding population 54.3% of TC participants are in the 50% regime. Note that the same control 
units are used for estimating the ATTs of these two treatment groups. Estimates of the competing risks 
for the whole sample of participants irrespectively of the TC-regime are shown in Figure 6, which also 
displays the sensitivity of the ATTs to the estimation method. To have an idea of the relative size of 
the ATT we report the survival rates of the treated and (reweighted) control units in Figure C.1 of 
Appendix C. As these people are more intensively treated, the positive ATT in the short-run and the 
negative ATT in the medium-run are also more pronounced compared to the participants in the 20% 
regime. As treated individuals remain entitled to the statutory (early) pension as full-time workers, 
their replacement rate is much higher than that of control individuals. This explains the strong 
response on the survival in employment without exit to statutory early retirement. Once we right 
censor these exits to statutory early retirement, the effect for TC participants with the 50% reduction 
is non-negative for the other two exit destinations. The treated individual working at 80% of a full-time 
have a less pronounced response, especially for the exit to statutory early retirement, and rather show 
more noticeable differences by gender (Figure 5). Different from the 50% regime, we now also observe 
for men a negative impact on the survival in employment without exit to the bridge pension, while for 
women the impact is insignificant.  
As described in Section 3, while the bridge pension is in general very appealing for older workers in 
Belgium, it is not for workers in the 50% TC-regime, because they lose a large part of the benefits. 
However, because this loss is less important for individuals in the 20% regime, the scheme still remains 
attractive for them. This incentive does not affect the behaviour of women, however, because they 
are on average less likely to work in industrial committees that intensively use the bridge pension as 
instrument to terminate employment (see Table 1), and, hence, have less opportunities to use this 
pathway to retirement. More generally, because women tend to have acquired slightly less labour 
market experience (and have lower past earnings) than men (Table 1), they are less likely to be eligible 
for (and earn a decent income when entering) early retirement which may explain their better overall 
effects of TC on the survival rate in employment. 
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Figure 4: ATT of Treated Men (A) and Women (B) in 50% TC Scheme - Competing Risk (CR) and 
Baseline (non-CR) Framework 
 
ATT of treated in the 50% TC on the survival rate controlling for the dynamic selection on observables (Vikström, 2014). The 
ATTs are differentiated by gender: Panel A for men and B for women. The estimates are expressed in percentage points (pp) 
differences in the survival rate in (from left to right and top to bottom) (1) employment, (2) employment without exit to a 
bridge pension, (3) employment without exit to a statutory pension before the normal retirement age (65 for men and women 
born after 30/11/1944, 64 for women born between 01/12/1942 and 30/11/1944 and 63 for women born before 
30/11//1942) and (4) employment without exit to other non-employment statuses. In the competing risk analyses (2-4), the 
exits from employment to other destinations, apart from the one considered, are right censored. Reported estimates are 
pooled over the 2003 and 2004 samples. Year eight only uses information from the 2003 sample. The pooled sample is 
composed of 567 (375) treated and 29,791 (9,658) control units (men and women). Standard errors are obtained by a 
stratified bootstrap (clustering by individual) with 500 repetitions and 95% confidence intervals (CI) by assuming normality. 
A 
B 
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Figure 5: ATT of Treated Men (A) and Women (B) in 20% TC Scheme - Competing Risk (CR) and 
Baseline (non-CR) Framework 
 
 
ATT of treated in the 20% TC on the survival rate controlling for the dynamic selection on observables (Vikström, 2014). The 
ATTs are differentiated by gender: Panel A for men and B for women. The estimates are expressed in percentage points (pp) 
differences in the survival rate in (from left to right and top to bottom) (1) employment, (2) employment without exit to a 
bridge pension, (3) employment without exit to a statutory pension before the normal retirement age (65 for men and women 
born after 30/11/1944, 64 for women born between 01/12/1942 and 30/11/1944 and 63 for women born before 
30/11//1942) and (4) employment without exit to other non-employment statuses. In the competing risk analyses (2-4), the 
exits from employment to other destinations, apart from the one considered, are right censored. Reported estimates are 
pooled over the 2003 and 2004 samples. Year eight only uses information from the 2003 sample. The pooled sample is 
composed of 660 (387) treated and 29,791 (9,658) control units (men and women). Standard errors are obtained by a 
stratified bootstrap (clustering by individual) with 500 repetitions and 95% confidence intervals (CI) by assuming normality. 
B 
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Next, as we argued that eligibility to early retirement affects the impact of the TC scheme, we split the 
sample between younger and older individuals. We set the cut-off age at 56.5 years at the moment of 
sample selection, i.e. at the end of year 0. In theory, the younger workers are too young to already be 
eligible to any of the early retirement schemes. Thus, we expect a longer-lasting positive effect for 
them. As shown in Figure C.3 in Appendix C, this is indeed what we find and corroborates therefore 
our interpretation of the findings.29  
Finally, we studied to what extent it matters for our results to take the dynamic assignment into 
treatment into account (Fredriksson and Johansson 2008) and to, in addition, control for selective (on 
observables) right censoring (Vikström, 2014). In Figure 6 we therefore compare our estimates based 
on Vikström’s (V) methodology to the descriptive estimator (raw data) on the one hand and to the 
estimator proposed by Fredriksson and Johansson (FJ) on the other hand. While in the descriptive 
evidence we ignore dynamic assignment to treatment in that we do not remove (i.e. exogenously right 
censor) controls becoming treated and do not control for differences in observables, we do when 
implementing the FJ estimator by IPW.  
We deduce the following two observations from Figure 6. First, the raw estimates are not very different 
from the ones that take the dynamic assignment into treatment into account (FJ), except for the 
survival in employment without exit to statutory early retirement in which case the raw estimates are 
downwards biased. Second, the FJ estimator is significantly downwards biased relative to the V 
estimator for the survival in employment without exit to the bridge pension and without other exit.  
These observations lead to the following conclusions. First, in the benchmark model (without 
competing destinations) the estimates are not sensitive to the employed estimator. This is because 
the selection on observables is not important and the bias induced by the dynamic assignment to the 
treatment is small, as only a small fraction of the not yet treated group enters into treatment later on. 
Second, the estimation method matters more when analysing competing risks, because in this analysis 
the fraction that is right censored (in both treatment and control groups) is much more important than 
the dynamic assignment into treatment. If the right censoring is selective on observables, which is 
clearly the case for exits to the statutory early retirement,30 then this bias can only be avoided by using 
the V estimator.  
                                                          
29 We have also estimated treatment heterogeneity with respect to labour market earnings at selection. The results are very 
similar to the different response by TC regime as two thirds of the treated high earnings group take the 50% regime 
(symmetric figures for the low earnings group). Results are available from the authors upon request. 
30 Since exits to the statutory early retirement are treated as right censored observations for the other two destinations, this 
explains the second observation that we deduced from Figure 6. The fact that the effect on the survival rate in employment 
without exit to the statutory early retirement does not differ very much using either the V or FJ estimator suggests that exits 
to the aforementioned other two destinations are not very selective. On the other hand, the fact that these estimates do 
differ from the raw estimates reflects again that exits to this destination are selective on observables.  
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Figure 6: ATT of Treated men (A) and Women (B) and Comparison with Other Estimators 
 
 
Vikström: ATT of treated on the survival rate controlling for the dynamic assignment to treatment & selective right-censoring on observables 
(Vikström, 2014); Fredriksson & Johansson: controlling for selection on observables in the year of selection (2003 or 2004) but not for 
selective right-censoring on observables (Fredriksson and Johansson, 2008); RAW: neither controlling for selection on observables, nor on 
dynamic assignment to treatment. The ATTs are differentiated by gender: Panel A for men and B for women. The estimates are expressed in 
percentage points (pp) differences in the survival rate in (from left to right and top to bottom) (1) employment, (2) employment without exit 
to a bridge pension, (3) employment without exit to a statutory pension before the normal retirement age (65 for men and women born 
after 30/11/1944, 64 for women born between 01/12/1942 and 30/11/1944 and 63 for women born before 30/11/1942) and (4) employment 
without exit to other non-employment statuses. In the competing risk analyses (2-4), the exits from employment to other destinations, apart 
from the one considered, are right censored. Reported estimates are pooled over the 2003 and 2004 samples. Year eight uses information 
from the 2003 sample. The sample is composed of 1,227 (762) treated and 29,791 (9,658) control units (men and women). Standard errors 
are obtained by a stratified bootstrap (clustering by individual) with 500 repetitions and 95% confidence intervals (CI) by assuming normality. 
A 
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In conclusion, our estimates suggest that older workers use part-time work at the end of the career as 
an alternative path to (early) retirement. This enables them to continue working until they become 
eligible to early retirement schemes. At that moment TC participants have much higher incentives to 
enter these schemes than non-participants. Moreover, the evidence is consistent with participants 
acting upon these incentives, since they not only leave employment faster than non-participants, but 
they also choose the exit channel that offers them the highest replacement income. We therefore 
believe that these supply side incentives matter more than other explanations advanced in the 
literature for these negative effects on the survival rate in employment, such as the higher hourly 
workload (Devisscher and Sanders, 2007; Rudolf, 2014), the TC signaling a preference to retire 
(Machado and Portela, 2012), or the reduced working time decreasing the labour market attachment. 
6.3. Including Sick Leave as Additional Exit Destination 
It has been argued that granting working time reductions can reduce the incidence of sickness (Ahn, 
2015). In this section we aim at testing this hypothesis by checking whether TC recipients are less likely 
to enter sick leave (while employed) than non-recipients. A first observation is, however, that few 
individuals in our sample do enter sick leave. In the control group the fraction is 14.8%, while in the 
treated group it is 13.0%. This is because our sample selection criteria exclude people with fragile 
health. More specifically, by imposing that workers should have at least five years of tenure in a firm, 
we exclude individuals who have temporarily interrupted employment during a full quarter, while 
including individuals who have been on sick leave throughout this quarter (Section 4.2). Because the 
fraction of individuals entering sick leave is relatively small, the impact of TC on this indicator of health 
cannot be large. Nevertheless, we attempted to estimate the ATT on sick leave to get a sense of the 
direction of the effect.  
Since so few individuals entered sick leave, we did not consider sick leave as a separate exit destination 
in the analysis, because the sample would become too small. Instead, we include sick leave as an 
additional exit destination, so that we estimate the impact of the TC on being employed and in good 
health. We then compare this treatment effect to the one we obtained for the benchmark model 
(Section 6.1). In Figure 7 we report these two treatment effects. We observe that the new treatment 
effect (dashed line) always exceeds the benchmark (solid line). This suggests that TC reduces the 
incidence of sick leave. However, the dashed line is mostly comprised in the 95% confidence interval 
of the benchmark ATT, suggesting that the effect is not statistically significant.  
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Figure 7: ATT on the Survival in Employment & Employment and Not on Sickness Leave  
 
ATT on the survival rate estimated by controlling for the dynamic selection on observables (Vikström, 2014). The survival is 
in employment (ATT empl.) or in employment while not on sick leave (ATT empl + no sick leave). The estimates are expressed 
in percentage points (pp). Estimates are pooled over the 2003 and 2004 samples. Year eight only uses information from the 
2003 sample. The pooled sample is composed of 1,227 (762) treated and 29,791 (9,658) control units (men and women). 
Standard errors are obtained by a stratified bootstrap (clustering by individual) with 500 repetitions and 95% confidence 
intervals (CI) by assuming normality The CI reported are referred to the benchmark scenario having employment as the 
outcome (ATT empl benchmark). 
 
7. Cost-Benefit Analysis 
To obtain an order of magnitude of the costs and benefits of the TC for the government budget and 
for society, we perform a cost-benefit analysis (CBA) along the lines proposed by Staubli and 
Zweimüller (2013). To that purpose we make use of the information available in the administrative 
dataset on the benefits and gross wages that are paid out to participants and non-participants in the 
TC. This information is then used to calculate for each individual and in each of the 8 years of analysis 
after the year of (counterfactual) entry in TC the real costs (or gains) in constant 2004 Euros for the 
government budget and for society. We weigh the control group by the appropriate IPW to make them 
comparable to the treated group and calculate for each of these years the average difference of these 
costs (gains). This provides an estimate of the average net cost (gain) per participant in TC for the 
government and society in each of these eight years (Staubli and Zweimüller, 2013; Albanese and 
Cockx, 2015). Differently from the ATT on the survival in employment, these have to be interpreted as 
the instantaneous net costs (gains) during those years. 
In the literature review we mentioned that Huber et al. (2015) found that in East-Germany 
participating women in the gradual retirement scheme were partially replaced by unemployed 
younger women. Whether this replacement occurs or not matters a lot for the CBA. Our data do not 
allow to test this hypothesis though. Nevertheless, we consider two scenarios in the CBA. One assumes 
that the part-time work is not replaced by another part-time worker, the other assumes that this part-
time work is replaced by another who earns an equivalent wage and is equally productive as the part-
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time worker. In this second scenario we do not take into account, however, the gains in terms of UB 
payments that would no longer have to be paid if the replacing worker came from unemployment.  
There are a number of reasons why we cannot perform a full-fledged CBA. First, as we will explain 
more in detail below, not all required information at the individual level is available in the 
administrative database. In these cases we substitute the individual level information by aggregate 
information obtained from other sources or, if it refers to a very small share of individuals, we ignore 
the information by setting it to zero. Second, the analysis ignores some important dimensions. For 
instance, in Section 6.3 we found some limited evidence that participation in the TC may have some 
small positive health effects. However, as we lack information on health costs, we cannot take this 
dimension into account. Moreover, we ignore the impact of participation in TC on the distribution of 
welfare or on poverty. All this means that the CBA should be taken as a crude approximation. 
7.1. Methodology 
We calculate, for each year t of the period of analysis above, the effect of the policy on two indicators, 
the Net Budgetary Cost for the Government (NBC) and the Net Welfare Cost for Society (NWC). Both 
indicators are expressed per treated individual and in monthly terms (2004 Euros).  
i. Net budgetary cost (gain) for the Government (NBC): This is the average cost (gain) of the policy 
for the state, net of savings for the public budget: 
   𝑁𝐵𝐶𝑡 = 𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑡 − 𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑡 ∗ 𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑢𝑡 − 𝑆𝑆𝐶𝑡,                      (7) 
with:  
- 𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑡: expenditures of the Government on allowances of the Social Security scheme, such as 
unemployment benefits and the TC allowance. Because the database lacks information on 
statutory pension, sickness and disability allowances, we impute these allowances as follows:  
- We assume that the worker has worked his entire career in the private sector and 
assume that the individual is paid the average pension in the private sector according 
to the age bracket to whom he belongs: 50-54, 55-59, 60-64, 65-69.  
- For sickness and disability benefits we set the allowance equal to the theoretical level 
of entitlement, i.e. to 60% of the individuals’ average monthly remuneration over the 
last six quarters.  
- 𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑡: The average personal income tax rate on the gross remuneration in every year (OECD, 
2015a).  
- 𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑢𝑡: the gross wage earnings. This is observed in the data for employees in the private and 
public sector, but not for the self-employed, for whom we impute a zero value for both treated 
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and control units. Since the share of self-employed individuals in the control group is larger 
(4.6%/2.0% of men / women) than in the treated group (2.0%/0.7% of men / women), this 
slightly biases our cost estimate downwards.  
- 𝑆𝑆𝐶𝑡: employer and employee contributions to Social Security. 
 
ii. Net Welfare cost (gain) for Society (NWC): the efficiency cost (“excess burden” or “deadweight 
loss”) of the net budgetary expenditures mentioned in (i) plus the opportunity cost of working 
minus the production value of employment (PV):  
𝑁𝑊𝐶𝑡 = (𝑀𝐶𝐹 − 1) ∗ 𝑁𝐵𝐶𝑡 + 𝐿𝐸𝐼𝑆𝑡 − 𝑃𝑉𝑡 
                                                                = (𝑀𝐶𝐹 − 1) ∗ 𝑁𝐵𝐶𝑡 + 𝐿𝐸𝐼𝑆𝑡 − (1 − 𝑃𝐺𝑡) ∗ 𝐿𝐶𝑡        (8) 
with: 
- 𝑀𝐶𝐹: the Marginal Cost of Public Funds.31 For Belgium a MCF equal to two is considered to be 
appropriate (Kleven and Kreiner, 2006; Barrios Cobos et al., 2013).  
- 𝐿𝐸𝐼𝑆𝑡: the opportunity cost of working, which has to be between zero and the net wage plus 
the SSC). In the latter we include both employee’s and employer’s Social Security contributions 
as they can be seen as an insurance premium to entitlements to Social Security benefits. 
Similarly to Greenberg and Robins (2008), we use the mid-point between the two bounds as 
our benchmark estimate. 
- 𝑃𝐺: the age-related pay-productivity gap takes into account that the wage cost of older 
workers exceeds their productivity. An estimate of the production value of labour (PV) is 
obtained by downward adjusting the labour costs (𝐿𝐶) by this gap. We use estimates of this 
pay-productivity gap provided by Vandenberghe et al. (2013) for the Belgian case.  
We consider a sensitivity analysis in two directions. First we consider two scenarios: one in which the 
effect of reduced working time on labour costs is taken into account and one in which it is not (i.e. full 
replacement of the reduced working hours for both treated and controls).  Second, we check the 
robustness of our results by varying three key parameters of our model:  
1. Two personal income tax rates: for persons earning 100% (benchmark) or 133% of the average 
wage. 
2. Three marginal costs of public funds: 1.41, 2.14 (benchmark) and 3.23 (Kleven and Kreiner, 
2006).  
                                                          
31 The net budgetary cost is in se not a cost to Society as it just involves transfers between individuals. 
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3. Three values for the opportunity cost of working: the aforementioned lower and upper bound, 
as well as the midpoint (benchmark). 
In order to measure the impact of TC on these indicators, we proceed in the following way. We run by 
gender a pooled weighted regression on all 8 years of analysis (𝑡 ∈ {1,2, … 8}) separately for 𝑠 ∈ {0,1}, 
i.e. the two samples of analysis:  
  √𝑊𝑖𝑡
𝑅𝑌𝑖𝑡 = ∑ (𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽𝑡1(𝑆𝑖 = 𝑠)) √𝑊𝑖𝑡
𝑅8
𝑡=𝑠+1 𝐷𝑡 + √𝑊𝑖𝑡
𝑅𝑢𝑖𝑡,        (9) 
with 
  𝑊𝑖𝑡
𝑅 ≡ 𝑊𝑐𝑟,𝑖 [1 +
𝑝𝑠(𝑋𝑖,𝑙𝑖)
1−𝑝𝑠(𝑋𝑖,𝑙𝑖)
1
∏ [1−𝑝𝑚(𝑋𝑖,𝑙𝑖)]
𝑡
𝑚=𝑠+1
1(𝑆𝑖 > 𝑡)]       (10) 
where 𝑌𝑖𝑡  measures the outcome of interest, i.e. NBC or NWC, for each individual 𝑖 in year 𝑡 after 
treatment assignment, 𝐷𝑡 is a year indicator equal to one in year 𝑡 and zero otherwise, 𝑢𝑖𝑡 is the error 
term of the regression. In this regression 𝛼𝑡 measures the average outcome for the control units that 
have not yet been treated in year 𝑡, i.e. 𝑆𝑖 > 𝑡 > 𝑠, so that 1(𝑆𝑖 = 𝑠) = 0, while 𝛽𝑡 measures the average 
treatment effect on the treated in year 𝑡 (ATTt), i.e. 𝑆𝑖 = 𝑠 < 𝑡, so that 1(𝑆𝑖 = 𝑠) = 0. The weights 𝑊𝑖𝑡
𝑅 
ensure that (i) the endogenous sampling is taken into account by weighing all individual observations 
by 𝑊𝑐𝑟,𝑖 , (ii) the control units that have not yet been treated are made, respectively kept comparable 
to the treated units by weighing them by the standard IPW 
𝑝𝑠(𝑋𝑖,𝑙𝑖)
1−𝑝𝑠(𝑋𝑖,𝑙𝑖)
 and by 
1
∏ [1−𝑝𝑚(𝑋𝑖,𝑙𝑖)]
𝑡
𝑚=𝑠+1
 to take 
the selective assignment into treatment over time into account. Note, in contrast to the analysis on 
the survival rate in employment, individuals who leave employment are not dropped from the analysis. 
Only individuals in the control group who become treated are dropped, but the weights avoid that this 
induces selectivity in the comparison between treated and control units. For each time period 𝑡 ∈
{1,2, … 8} we can then estimate the ATTt on NBC or on NWC for each treatment group 𝑠 ∈ {0,1} by 
?̂?𝑡−𝑠, where the hat denotes the estimate of the weighted regression in (10). Subsequently, we average 
over treatment groups in a similar way as in (6).  
7.2. Results 
The results of the benchmark cost-benefit analysis (CBA) can be found in Figure 8, which shows the 
monthly cost per treated for the government budget and the welfare cost to society. Both the 
scenarios with and without replacement of part-time workers are discussed.  
Without the replacement of part-time workers, the results indicate that the TC scheme is an expensive 
policy that fails the cost-benefit test. Although in the first years we have estimated a positive 
employment effect, the costs of the policy immediately dominate the benefits. In the first year of the 
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analysis the monthly costs to the government budget in the baseline case are €878 (€696) per treated 
person for men (women). That these budgetary costs for the government already exist from the first 
years indicate that the positive effects on employment at the extensive margin are immediately 
dominated by the reduction of working hours and the allowance paid to the TC participants. In 
particular, (i) treated people reduce their working hours, resulting in less income for the government 
in the form of taxes; (ii) TC participants receive the TC benefit, resulting in higher expenditures for the 
government. As a reduction in working hours also implies lower production, the monthly total welfare 
costs per treated individual are even higher: €1,706 (€1,345) for men (women). The costs to society 
show a decreasing pattern, while near the end of the analysis we observe a stronger decrease for both 
the costs to the government and the society. As already mentioned, this convergence is induced by 
the fact that all individuals eventually retire, irrespectively of treatment, so that costs converge to zero.  
If full replacement of the reduced working hours is assumed, a small short-run positive welfare gain 
for society emerges, but only for women. This is because in this scenario no working hours are lost 
when a participant enters the TC scheme. To the extent that there are positive employment effects as 
discussed in Section 6.1, this reduces the negative budgetary impact, while the net gain for society also 
comes from the positive impact of the TC scheme on the value of leisure. The largest potential benefits 
are obtained at the start of the analysis and are larger and longer-lasting for women, as they have 
more favourable short-run employment effects.32 The welfare cost to Society is about zero in year two 
and four, respectively for men and women. At those points the ATTs on the survival rate in 
employment was estimated to be about 3.5 pp. This suggests that a positive ATT of about 3.5 
percentage points is required to break-even in terms of social welfare. However, this is measured for 
the most optimistic scenario. In reality it is unlikely that employers could replace all reduced working 
time. 
In Appendix C we included two summary tables (Table C.1 and Table C.2) containing the effects for our 
sensitivity analyses in which we consider all possible scenarios. Though the magnitude of the estimates 
in the sensitivity analysis changes, the qualitative results are in line with the findings of the baseline 
scenario. Our CBA ignores distributional effects and effects on other channels such as health. However, 
it is clear that without full replacement, the policy fails the cost-benefit test. 
 
 
                                                          
32 There are almost no benefits for the government budget, while the monthly welfare benefits for society are larger in year 
one (two) for men (women), when they amount to €80 (231) per treated man (woman). Similar to the ATT on survival in 
employment, the period with a welfare gain lasts only one year for men, while three years for women. 
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Figure 8: Monthly Cost of the TC per Treated of 2003 (2004) 
 
Cost-benefit analysis (CBA) on the pooled sample of participants in TC of 2003 and 2004. CBA in monthly costs (benefits if 
negative) in 2004 euros per treated individual (the size of the treated sample as defined in 2003/2004). The Net Budgetary 
Cost (NBC) for the government is the average cost (gain) of the policy for the state, net of savings for the public budget. The 
Net Welfare Cost (NWC) for society is the efficiency cost of the NBC minus the production value of employment (PV). Baseline 
scenario: CBA without replacement of the part-time workers. Replacement scenario: baseline scenario with the additional 
assumption that all hours reduced by part-time workers (treated and controls) are recovered by hiring extra workers with 
similar characteristics. The CBA ignores potential substitution and anticipation effects. The costs to society ignore the value 
of leisure and potential distributional and health impacts of the measure. The CBA spans all eight years of the ATT analysis 
(Section 6.1). Year 1 is the first year for which we calculate the ATT. Year 8 only contains information from the 2003 sample. 
In line with our employment analysis we considered the heterogeneous effects of splitting the sample 
by age, using the same cut-off as in the employment analysis (see Figure C.2 in Appendix C). This 
analysis shows that while the policy is more costly for younger workers when we do not consider 
replacement, it also has the greatest scope for positive budgetary effects once the replacement is 
taken into account. The potential benefits are greater and longer-lasting for (especially female) 
younger workers, as they also have longer lasting positive employment effects (cf. Section 6.1).  
8. Conclusion  
This paper studies the effect on employment of a scheme that facilitates gradual retirement through 
working time reductions. Recently, many EU countries have implemented such measures with the aim 
to postpone the retirement of older workers. However, evidence on the effectiveness of such policies 
is scarce and provides mixed results. Our research provides new evidence on this question by 
evaluating the impact of the Time Credit (TC) scheme in Belgium allowing workers above the age of 50 
to reduce their working time until the statutory retirement age. 
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We contributed methodologically to this literature by explicitly taking the dynamic assignment into 
treatment into account (Johansson and Fredriksson 2008), and by explicitly considering a competing 
risks model that allows measuring the treatment effect according to different (possibly selective) 
pathways to early retirement. To model this dynamic selection and possibly selective right censoring 
within this competing risks model, we slightly adjusted the methodology recently proposed by 
Vikström (2014) to take the stock sampling in employment at the start of the treatment into account. 
We find that the correction for selective right censoring matters to avoid bias, especially in the 
competing risks framework.  
Overall our evidence is in line with the findings of Graf et al. (2011). Participation in TC initially prolongs 
the time spent in employment (during the first two years for men and four years for women), but 
subsequently it accelerates the exit to early retirement. In the beginning the effect is positive, 
presumably because participants are not yet eligible to early retirement. However, as soon as they are, 
participants have much higher incentives to enter it than non-participants, because the replacement 
rates in these schemes (with regard to their labour income) are much higher for TC participants than 
for non-participants. These financial incentives are on the one hand much stronger for individuals who 
reduce their working time to 50% of a full-time job than for those who reduce it to 80%, and on the 
other hand also for workers who are eligible for the statutory early retirement scheme relative to those 
who are not. Our evidence supports that individuals behave according to these incentives. Besides, the 
impact of TC is more favourable for women than for men, because women have less opportunities to 
enter early retirement. 
The gradual retirement scheme fails the cost-benefit test. Only under the extreme assumption that 
employers fully compensate for all working time reductions by new equally productive workers the TC 
scheme displays a net benefit for society during the first two (four) years for men (women). 
Nevertheless, our findings suggest that the scheme could become socially cost-effective if the 
opportunities for early retirement were blocked or made financially less attractive. In the analysis in 
which we allowed for three different exit destinations from employment, we found indeed that for the 
exit destinations that were financially less attractive the effect of the TC on the survival rate in 
employment no longer became negative or even remained significantly positive in some cases.  
Given this responsiveness to the financial incentives, we believe it may be possible to prolong the 
positive effect of TC schemes by eliminating the perverse incentives to exit earlier from the labour 
force. A possible policy proposal to enhance the scheme might be to leave the entitlement to full-time 
pension only to the participants exiting at the statutory retirement age and accordingly adjust the 
entitlements of the early leavers. Since 2015 the Belgian government has raised the eligibility age to 
bridge pensions from 58 to 62 years (with some exceptions) and the minimum age to be eligible to the 
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conventional early retirement is gradually increased since 2012 from 60 years to attain 63 years in 
2019. Based on our findings we speculate that this could increase the effectiveness of the Time-Credit 
scheme. However, since 2015 the Belgian government has also raised the minimum age of eligibility 
of the end of career TC to 60 years. As a consequence, the starting age of gradual retirement has been 
set so close to the minimum early retirement age that it can hardly have any significant positive effect 
on the career length of employees. While the decision to raise the early retirement age can be 
supported on the basis of our findings, the decision to simultaneously increase the minimum age of 
eligibility to the end of career TC scheme cannot. We call for further research to obtain better 
foundations for these policy recommendations.  
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Appendix 
A. Comparison of Gradual or Part-Time Retirement Schemes in Other European Countries 
Table A.1: Comparison of Gradual or Part-Time Retirement Schemes in Other European Countries 
Country Policy Years in place Age-Eligibility Replacement Rate Reduction in Hours 
Sweden 
Part Time Pension 1976-2000 61y 55% from 1994 onwards 10h/week (i.e. max 25% workweek) 
Part Time Pension 2003 - … 61y 60% of reduction in wage as much as 50% until 65y 
Finland Part-Time Pension 
Since 1987 in the 
private sector, 1989 
public sector 
56 (<2005), then 58 and 60 
(>=2011). Until 64 
50% difference regular and 
part-time earnings 
16-28h/week 
Denmark Part Time pensions 1987 60-64 fixed rate/reduced hour having a workweek of 12-30h/week 
France Phased Early Retirement (PRP) 1988-2005 55-65 top up of 30% 40-50% 
Germany Part Time Retirement 1996-2009 55+ 70% top up 50% (blocking possible) 
Austria 
Old Age Part-Time scheme 
(OAPT) 
2000… 
>=55 (m), >50(w) + career 
restrictions 
75% 
40-60%, max 6 1/2 y (blocking 
possible) 
Netherlands Life Course Regulation 2006-2011 
whole career, but can also be used 
as part time retirement two years 
before retirement) 
own savings, 70% now 50% 
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B. The (Endogenous) Stratification of the Sample 
The population is stratified for each gender in 9 birth cohorts defined in Table B.1. The reference 
periods by birth cohort were chosen as to observe sufficient transitions in and out of private sector 
employment for both treatment and control groups determined as to evaluate the 2002 reform 
mentioned in the main text on the basis of a difference-in-differences strategy (Albanese and Cockx, 
2015). Each of these 18 strata is subsequently endogenously stratified in five substrata:  
1. The population exiting salaried employment in the private sector within the reference period; 
2. The population entering salaried employment in the private sector within the reference period 
and not contained in substratum 1; 
3. The population employed throughout the reference period as salaried worker in the private 
sector and earning a gross wage lower than €100 per day at the start of this period; 
4. The population employed throughout the reference period as salaried worker in the private 
sector and earning at least €100 per day at the start of this period; 
5. The population that was not employed as salaried worker in the private sector during the 
reference period, i.e. individuals who were out of the labour force, unemployed, self-employed or 
working in the public sector. 
 
Table B.1 : Retained Birth Cohorts and Corresponding Reference Periods 
 Cohort (quarter/year) Reference Period (quarter/year) 
1 2/41-1/42 [2/99-1/02] 
2 2/42-1/43 [2/99-4/01] 
3 2/43-1/44 [2/99-4/03] 
4 2/44-1/45 [2/00-1/05] 
5 2/45-1/46 [2/99-4/03] 
6 2/46-1/47 [2/00-4/04] 
7 2/47-1/48 [2/00-3/05] 
8 2/48-1/49 [2/02-3/05] 
9 2/49-1/50 [2/02-3/05] 
 
In each of the 18 strata a random sample of 2,000 individuals is drawn in this substratum, while the 
sample size was 1,500 for substratum 4 and 5.37 The size of the population is known for each 
substratum, so that it was straightforward to construct the appropriate weights to make inference on 
the population.  
                                                          
37 In cases that the population of the substratum was smaller than the population, the complete population was sampled. 
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C. Supplementary Tables and Figures 
Figure C.1: Survival Rate in Employment (Benchmark) and Competing Risks – Men (A) and Women (B)  
  
  
Survival function of the treated and control units controlling for the dynamic selection on observables (Vikström, 2014) by gender (Panel A 
for men and B for women). The survival rates are expressed in percentage points (pp) and defined as (from left to right and top to bottom) 
(1) employment, (2) employment without exit to a bridge pension, (3) employment without exit to a statutory pension before the normal 
retirement age (65 for men and women born after 30/11/1944, 64 for women born between 01/12/1942 and 30/11/1944 and 63 for women 
born before 30/11//1942) and (4) employment without exit to other non-employment statuses. In the competing risk analyses (2-4), the 
exits from employment to other destinations, apart from the one considered, are right censored. Reported estimates are pooled over the 
2003 and 2004 samples. Year eight only uses information from the 2003 sample. The pooled sample is composed of 1,227 (762) treated and 
29,791 (9,658) control units (men and women).  
A 
B 
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Figure C.2: Monthly Cost of Policy per Treated for Men (panel A) and Women (panel B)  
 
 
Cost-benefit analysis (CBA) on the pooled sample of participants in TC of 2003 and 2004 (panel A for men, panel B for women). 
CBA in monthly costs (benefits if negative) in 2004 euros per treated individual (the size of the treated sample as defined in 
2003 / 2004). The Net Budgetary Cost (NBC) for the government is the average cost (gain) of the policy for the state, net of 
savings for the public budget. The Net Welfare Cost (NWC) for society is the efficiency cost of the NBC minus the production 
value of employment (PV). Baseline scenario: CBA without replacement of the part-time workers. Replacement scenario: 
baseline scenario with additional assumption that all hours reduced by part-time workers (treated and controls) are 
recovered by hiring extra workers with similar characteristics. Younger workers are aged strictly below age 56.5 at the 
moment of sample selection (year 0), older workers are aged 56.5 and above at that moment. The CBA ignores potential 
substitution and anticipation effects. The costs to society ignore the value of leisure and potential distributional and health 
impacts of the measure. The CBA spans all eight years of the ATT analysis from Section 6.1. Year one is the first year for which 
we calculate the ATT. Year eight only contains information from the 2003 sample.  
A 
B 
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Figure C.3: ATT on Survival in Employment – Heterogeneous Effects by Age 
 
ATT on the survival rate in employment estimated by controlling for the dynamic selection on observables (Vikström, 2014). 
Heterogeneous effects by age in year 0: younger (below the age of 56.5) and older workers (at least 56.5 years old). The 
estimates of the ATT’s are the percentage points (pp) differences between the survival rate of the treated in case of treatment 
and the estimated survival rate of the treated in the counterfactual of no treatment. Estimates are pooled over the 2003 and 
2004 samples. Year eight only uses information from the 2003 sample. Standard errors are obtained by a stratified bootstrap 
(clustering by individual) with 500 repetitions and 95% confidence intervals (CI) by assuming normality. 
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Table C.1:  Sensitivity analysis on Cost-Benefit Analysis - men 
(A) 
MCF 
 
(B) 
Reservation 
Wage 
(C) 
Income 
taxes 
(1) No replacement of part-time workers (2) Replacement of part-time workers 
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 Year 8 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 Year 8 
(α) NET BUDGETARY COST (NBC) FOR THE GOVERNMENT  
- - Medium  878.3 803.0 791.2 817.0 906.1 732.6 540.0 388.6 90.7 119.2 222.7 359.6 596.2 508.9 371.5 273.8 
- - High 914.1 835.7 823.1 850.5 941.4 760.2 559.5 402.6 78.6 111.5 224.3 373.8 627.5 537.0 391.3 288.0 
(β) NET WELFARE COST (NWC) FOR SOCIETY 
1.41 Low Medium 1,505.2 1,306.4 1,185.0 1,142.1 1,123.5 817.1 530.7 371.0 -306.8 -170.3 126.0 494.0 992.0 839.2 544.8 373.1 
1.41 Low High 1,519.8 1,319.8 1,198.1 1,155.9 1,138.0 828.4 538.7 376.7 -311.8 -173.5 126.7 499.8 1,004.8 850.7 552.9 378.9 
1.41 Medium Medium 1,022.1 864.3 755.4 698.0 653.1 450.9 271.5 182.8 -143.7 -67.9 100.0 305.7 575.4 464.8 279.5 182.1 
1.41 Medium High 1,054.7 894.1 784.4 728.4 685.3 475.9 289.2 195.5 -154.7 -74.9 101.5 318.7 603.9 490.4 297.6 195.0 
1.41 High Medium 539.1 422.1 325.8 253.8 182.6 84.6 12.4 -5.5 19.3 34.6 74.0 117.4 158.9 90.5 14.2 -8.9 
1.41 High High 589.6 468.3 370.7 300.9 232.5 123.4 39.7 14.3 2.3 23.6 76.3 137.5 203.0 130.1 42.2 11.0 
2.14 Low Medium 2,189.4 1,906.3 1,723.1 1,644.4 1,602.2 1,176.1 786.7 560.6 -243.5 -85.9 285.4 753.1 1,421.1 1,206.5 807.4 566.6 
2.14 Low High 2,230.2 1,943.6 1,759.5 1,682.5 1,642.6 1,207.6 808.8 576.5 -257.3 -94.7 287.3 769.4 1,456.8 1,238.6 830.0 582.8 
2.14 Medium Medium 1,706.4 1,464.1 1,293.5 1,200.2 1,131.8 809.9 527.5 372.3 -80.4 16.5 259.4 564.9 1,004.6 832.2 542.1 375.6 
2.14 Medium High 1,765.1 1,517.8 1,345.7 1,255.1 1,189.8 855.1 559.3 395.3 -100.3 3.8 262.1 588.3 1,055.9 878.3 574.6 398.8 
2.14 High Medium 1,223.3 1,022.0 863.9 756.0 661.4 443.6 268.3 184.1 82.6 119.0 233.4 376.6 588.0 457.9 276.8 184.7 
2.14 High High 1,299.9 1,092.1 932.0 827.6 737.1 502.6 309.9 214.1 56.8 102.4 236.9 407.1 654.9 518.1 319.3 214.9 
3.23 Low Medium 3,211.1 2,801.9 2,526.6 2,394.4 2,317.1 1,712.2 1,168.9 843.7 -149.0 40.2 523.5 1,140.1 2,061.9 1,755.1 1,199.4 855.7 
3.23 Low High 3,290.9 2,874.9 2,597.6 2,469.0 2,396.0 1,773.6 1,212.2 874.9 -176.0 22.9 527.0 1,171.9 2,131.6 1,817.8 1,243.7 887.2 
3.23 Medium Medium 2,728.0 2,359.8 2,097.0 1,950.2 1,846.6 1,345.9 909.7 655.4 14.1 142.6 497.5 951.9 1,645.3 1,380.8 934.1 664.7 
3.23 Medium High 2,825.8 2,449.2 2,183.9 2,041.5 1,943.2 1,421.1 962.7 693.6 -18.9 121.4 501.8 990.8 1,730.7 1,457.5 988.4 703.3 
3.23 High Medium 2,245.0 1,917.6 1,667.3 1,506.0 1,376.2 979.7 650.5 467.2 177.2 245.0 471.5 763.6 1,228.8 1,006.4 668.8 473.7 
3.23 High High 2,360.6 2,023.4 1,770.2 1,614.1 1,490.5 1,068.7 713.2 512.4 138.1 220.0 476.7 809.7 1,329.8 1,097.3 733.0 519.4 
Cost-benefit analysis (CBA) on the pooled sample of male participants in TC of 2003 and 2004. Treated sample size defined in 2003-2004. CBA in monthly costs (benefits if negative) in 2004 
euros per treated individual under different scenarios. Scenario in bold denotes baseline scenario. (1) No replacement of part-time workers scenario; and (2) replacement scenario: baseline 
scenario with additional assumption that all hours reduced by part-time workers (treated and controls) are recovered by hiring extra workers with similar characteristics. Additionally (A) Marginal 
Cost of public Funds (MCF) equal to 1.41, 2.14, or 3.23 (Kleven and Kreiner, 2006), (B) opportunity cost of working (Reservation Wage) with a lower, medium and upper bound (see Section 7.1) 
and (C) Income Tax Rate, variable over time: medium (average income) which is on average 28.26%, higher (133% average income) which is on average 32.36% (OECD stat extract, 2003-2011). 
The first outcome variable is the Net Budgetary Cost (NBC) for the government (α), i.e. the average cost (gain) of the policy for the state, net of savings for the public budget. The second is the 
Net Welfare Cost (NWC) for society (β), i.e. the efficiency cost of the NBC minus the production value of employment. The CBA ignores potential substitution and anticipation effects. The costs 
to society ignore potential distributional and health impacts of the measure. The CBA spans all eight years of the ATT analysis from Section 6.1. Year one is the first year for which we calculate 
the ATT. Year eight only contains information from the 2003 sample
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Table C.2:  Sensitivity analysis on Cost-Benefit Analysis - women 
(A) 
MCF 
 
(B) 
Reservation 
Wage 
(C) 
Income 
taxes 
(1) No replacement of part-time workers (2) Replacement of part-time workers 
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 Year 8 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 Year 8 
(α) NET BUDGETARY COST (NBC) FOR THE GOVERNMENT  
- - Medium  695.5 533.5 485.0 466.0 565.1 495.5 429.6 357.6 67.0 3.8 33.5 119.3 362.8 322.8 271.7 237.8 
- - High 721.9 554.2 504.2 484.8 589.2 515.5 446.2 371.4 53.9 -11.5 22.3 115.9 379.7 339.2 286.0 250.7 
(β) NET WELFARE COST (NWC) FOR SOCIETY 
1.41 Low Medium 1,139.7 872.2 761.1 684.7 777.2 598.3 467.6 374.5 -366.8 -442.7 -302.2 -50.5 558.5 496.6 414.6 355.8 
1.41 Low High 1,150.6 880.8 769.0 692.4 787.1 606.5 474.4 380.2 -372.2 -449.0 -306.8 -51.9 565.4 503.3 420.5 361.1 
1.41 Medium Medium 790.1 601.2 511.0 439.7 461.9 335.8 248.9 192.9 -185.7 -228.9 -145.7 -2.8 336.2 281.3 224.9 186.6 
1.41 Medium High 814.2 620.1 528.5 456.8 483.8 354.1 264.0 205.5 -197.6 -242.8 -155.8 -5.9 351.5 296.3 238.0 198.3 
1.41 High Medium 440.5 330.1 261.0 194.7 146.6 73.3 30.1 11.3 -4.6 -15.0 10.9 44.9 113.9 66.1 35.1 17.3 
1.41 High High 477.8 359.4 288.0 221.2 180.5 101.6 53.5 30.8 -23.1 -36.6 -4.9 40.1 137.7 89.2 55.4 35.5 
2.14 Low Medium 1,694.9 1,324.0 1,156.3 1,032.4 1,125.8 876.3 692.4 559.0 -320.9 -445.0 -286.3 25.1 819.6 730.0 611.2 527.5 
2.14 Low High 1,725.0 1,347.7 1,178.2 1,053.8 1,153.2 899.2 711.3 574.7 -335.8 -462.5 -299.1 21.3 838.9 748.7 627.6 542.2 
2.14 Medium Medium 1,345.3 1,052.9 906.2 787.5 810.5 613.8 473.6 377.4 -139.8 -231.1 -129.8 72.9 597.3 514.7 421.4 358.3 
2.14 Medium High 1,388.6 1,087.0 937.7 818.2 849.9 646.7 500.8 400.0 -161.3 -256.3 -148.2 67.3 625.0 541.6 445.0 379.4 
2.14 High Medium 995.7 781.8 656.2 542.5 495.1 351.4 254.8 195.8 41.3 -17.3 26.7 120.6 375.0 299.5 231.6 189.1 
2.14 High High 1,052.3 826.4 697.3 582.7 546.6 394.3 290.4 225.3 13.3 -50.1 2.8 113.3 411.2 334.6 262.4 216.7 
3.23 Low Medium 2,523.8 1,998.5 1,746.4 1,551.7 1,646.3 1,291.5 1,027.9 834.5 -252.3 -448.4 -262.7 138.1 1,209.5 1,078.5 904.6 784.0 
3.23 Low High 2,582.7 2,044.9 1,789.2 1,593.6 1,699.9 1,336.2 1,065.0 865.2 -281.6 -482.6 -287.6 130.6 1,247.2 1,115.0 936.7 812.7 
3.23 Medium Medium 2,174.2 1,727.4 1,496.3 1,306.8 1,330.9 1,029.0 809.2 652.9 -71.2 -234.5 -106.1 185.8 987.2 863.2 714.8 614.8 
3.23 Medium High 2,246.3 1,784.2 1,548.8 1,358.0 1,396.6 1,083.7 854.5 690.5 -107.0 -276.4 -136.7 176.6 1,033.3 908.0 754.1 649.9 
3.23 High Medium 1,824.6 1,456.4 1,246.3 1,061.8 1,015.6 766.5 590.4 471.3 109.9 -20.7 50.4 233.5 765.0 648.0 525.1 445.6 
3.23 High High 1,910.0 1,523.5 1,308.3 1,122.4 1,093.3 831.3 644.1 515.8 67.5 -70.2 14.3 222.7 819.5 700.9 571.5 487.2 
Cost-benefit analysis (CBA) on the pooled sample of female participants in TC of 2003 and 2004. Treated sample size defined in 2003-2004. CBA in monthly costs (benefits if negative) in 2004 
euros per treated individual under different scenarios. Scenario in bold denotes baseline scenario. (1) No replacement of part-time workers scenario; and (2) replacement scenario: baseline 
scenario with additional assumption that all hours reduced by part-time workers (treated and controls) are recovered by hiring extra workers with similar characteristics. Additionally (A) Marginal 
Cost of public Funds (MCF) equal to 1.41, 2.14, or 3.23 (Kleven and Kreiner, 2006), (B) opportunity cost of working (Reservation Wage) with a lower, medium and upper bound (see Section 7.1) 
and (C) Income Tax Rate, variable over time: medium (income tax on the average income) which is on average 28.26%, higher (income tax on 133% of the average income) which is on average 
32.36% (OECD stat extract, 2003-2011). The first outcome variable is the Net Budgetary Cost (NBC) for the government (α), i.e. the average cost (gain) of the policy for the state, net of savings 
for the public budget. The second is the Net Welfare Cost (NWC) for society (β), i.e. the efficiency cost of the NBC minus the production value of employment. The CBA ignores potential 
substitution and anticipation effects. The costs to society ignore potential distributional and health impacts of the measure. The CBA spans all eight years of the ATT analysis from Section 6.1. 
Year one is the first year for which we calculate the ATT. Year eight only contains information from the 2003 sample. 
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Table C.3 : Balancing tests: Standardized Bias (SB), pvalue on mean equality and others 
  Men Women 
  2003 2004 2003 2004 
  
Treated: 
mean 
Control: 
mean 
SB 
(1) 
Pvalue 
(2) 
Treated: 
mean 
Control: 
mean 
SB 
(1) 
Pvalue 
(2) 
Treated: 
mean 
Control: 
mean 
SB 
(1) 
Pvalue 
(2) 
Treated: 
mean 
Control: 
mean 
SB 
(1) 
Pvalue 
(2) 
Status one 
year before 
selection 
(2002 or 2003) 
Firm size: 20-99 21.2% 20.9% 0.6 0.891 15.7% 16.0% -0.8 0.852 26.7% 26.9% -0.4 0.934 26.2% 27.1% -1.9 0.744 
Firm size: 100-999 33.3% 33.0% 0.6 0.893 28.0% 28.9% -1.9 0.711 31.5% 31.3% 0.5 0.924 23.5% 24.0% -1.0 0.864 
Firm size: > 1000 45.5% 46.0% -1.1 0.821 56.3% 55.1% 2.6 0.655 41.7% 41.8% -0.1 0.986 50.2% 48.9% 2.7 0.679 
Household: Other 11.3% 11.2% 0.3 0.950 11.4% 11.4% 0.1 0.979 36.3% 36.2% 0.2 0.977 35.2% 35.1% 0.3 0.955 
Couple & children 47.7% 46.8% 1.8 0.707 45.7% 45.2% 1.1 0.844 21.8% 21.7% 0.3 0.954 27.1% 27.4% -0.7 0.918 
Couple no children 41.0% 42.0% -2.0 0.673 42.8% 43.4% -1.3 0.829 41.8% 42.0% -0.4 0.940 37.6% 37.5% 0.3 0.967 
Age  55.3 55.3 -0.4 0.924 55.7 55.7 0.1 0.978 55.1 55.1 0.6 0.902 55.8 55.8 -1.5 0.776 
Blue collar 26.5% 26.3% 0.4 0.926 19.7% 20.7% -2.4 0.608 11.2% 11.1% 0.1 0.984 9.4% 9.8% -1.3 0.811 
Full-Time Hourly wage € 20.4 € 20.3 1.3 0.722 € 21.1 € 20.9 2.3 0.566 € 17.3 € 17.3 0.4 0.941 € 17.6 € 17.5 2.0 0.687 
Belgian 97.9% 97.9% -0.1 0.972 98.0% 97.9% 0.5 0.905 97.7% 97.7% 0.1 0.991 96.5% 96.2% 2.0 0.749 
Household size 2.6 2.6 1.5 0.743 2.6 2.6 0.9 0.870 2.1 2.1 0.2 0.967 2.1 2.1 0.3 0.964 
Region: Bruxelles 4.8% 4.7% 0.3 0.947 7.2% 7.0% 0.7 0.901 15.2% 15.1% 0.2 0.964 15.7% 15.5% 0.6 0.923 
Region: Flanders 72.4% 73.0% -1.3 0.780 65.8% 66.3% -1.2 0.831 51.2% 51.2% 0.1 0.989 52.3% 52.8% -1.1 0.857 
Region: Wallonia 22.8% 22.2% 1.2 0.791 27.1% 26.7% 0.9 0.875 33.5% 33.7% -0.3 0.963 32.0% 31.7% 0.8 0.905 
Trade, transport, hotel 15.7% 15.5% 0.5 0.901 14.3% 14.9% -1.4 0.766 23.5% 23.5% -0.1 0.980 19.5% 20.0% -1.1 0.854 
Bank, business services 39.1% 40.0% -2.1 0.697 51.5% 50.2% 2.9 0.654 34.4% 34.3% 0.2 0.970 45.7% 44.3% 2.9 0.671 
Other services 4.1% 4.0% 0.4 0.921 4.1% 4.2% -0.5 0.907 22.6% 22.7% -0.2 0.970 20.4% 20.9% -1.3 0.821 
Manuf., Agric., Constr. 36.9% 36.3% 1.2 0.798 24.8% 25.3% -1.1 0.830 19.6% 19.5% 0.1 0.985 14.4% 14.8% -0.9 0.863 
Construction  4.2% 4.2% 0.4 0.927 5.4% 5.5% -0.5 0.916                 
Prop. to early retire*  -0.1% -0.2% 0.8 0.852 -2.2% -2.0% -2.5 0.593 -3.2% -3.2% -0.2 0.973 -4.1% -4.0% -2.2 0.702 
5 years before 
sel. 
Full-Time  
Hourly wage 
€ 19.8 € 19.7 1.3 0.709 € 20.9 € 20.7 2.4 0.561 € 16.9 € 16.9 0.4 0.940 € 17.2 € 17.1 2.2 0.661 
13 years 
before sel. 
Years with the same 
employers 
10.6 10.5 3.8 0.475 10.9 10.9 -0.3 0.954 11.0 11.0 -0.2 0.975 11.2 11.2 -1.5 0.820 
‘90-‘97 Av. Working time % 97.9 97.9 0.1 0.983 98.1 98.0 1.5 0.714 96.0 95.8 1.7 0.774 95.7 95.6 1.1 0.863 
‘57-‘90 Experience in years 31.4 31.5 -0.8 0.857 30.8 30.8 -0.4 0.937 30.5 30.5 0.3 0.944 29.6 29.6 0.7 0.897 
‘57-‘90 Earnings in the year € 28,599 € 28,453 1.3 0.721 € 29,742 € 29,459 2.6 0.548 € 23,514 € 23,460 0.7 0.903 € 24,199 € 23,990 2.6 0.648 
N individuals 
Sample 754 17,876     473 11,915     421 5,353     341 4,305     
Population 2,012 41,330     1,851 34,448     669 7,829     592 6,780     
 
 2003   2004 
Sample 
Pseudo-
R2 
Wald test: 
pvalue 
Mean 
Standardized Bias 
Median 
Standardized Bias 
Max Standardized 
Bias 
Pseudo-
R2 
Wald test: 
pvalue 
Mean 
Standardized Bias 
Median 
Standardized Bias 
Max Standardized 
Bias 
Raw Men 0.068 0.000 15.6% 11.5% 48.0% 0.127 0.000 20.9% 15.1% 74.2% 
Reweighted Men 0.000 1.000 1.0% 0.8% 3.8% 0.000 1.000 1.3% 1.1% 2.9% 
Raw Women 0.026 0.000 9.5% 8.2% 22.5% 0.083 0.000 15.9% 11.8% 50.0% 
Reweighted Women 0.000 1.000 0.3% 0.2% 1.7% 0.000 1.000 1.4% 1.2% 2.9% 
Balancing tests after reweighting the individuals by using the weights of the year of selection (2003 or 2004). The upper panel reports the mean of the covariates by treatment status with (1) Standardized Bias and (2) 
pvalue of the t-test. The lower panel shows the results of other balancing tests before and after reweighting the individuals by such weights. 
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